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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with examining the nature and purpose of ~nvironmental 
impact assessment (EIA) in environmental and resource management. The process 
of EIA is frequently conceived to be a wholly scientific and objective 
exercise, Wldertaken in order to "protect the environment". The inherent 
contradictions of this perception have stimulated an interest in examining 
the relationship between "rational" assessments and decision-making activities 
which are essentially political. 
A concern for the effectiveness of "environmental protection" activities in 
New Zealand Wlder the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures 
has focussed the study on the question of what makes a process involving 
EIA effective? Effectiveness certainly means different things to different 
people, as evidenced by controversies surroWlding the general success or 
otherwise of EIA, and its influence in particular cases of development 
planning. Such controversy naturally begs the questions, what is EIA for, 
why, and under what circumstances can it be considered effective? 
The study attempts to answer these questions, by developing a framework for 
understanding the preconditions of effectiveness of the environmental impact 
assessment and review process; firstly in the international context, and then 
in the New Zealand setting. 
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Are aU our efforts to improve our Zot shortcircuited 
by the impossibility of knowing in what direction 
improvement lies? 
Clarence Ayres 
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If you want knowledge~ you must take part ~n 
the practice of changing reality. 
Mao Tse-Tung 
PART I 
CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the nature of a complex technical and social process 
known as environmental impact assessment (EIA). EIA operates in an 
increasing number of technologically developed countries, and is an insti-
tutional response to the perception of an equally complex problem. Develop-
ment activities have always caused changes in the physical lpndscape and in 
people's living environments. However, the nature and scale of resource 
use can lead to significant and often irreversible changes for societies, 
in ways not fully appreciated when decisions are made. This study addresses 
the problem of coping with adverse and unexpected change, by examining the 
role and the value of EIA activities, both internationally and in New Zealand. 
The study is divided into three parts. Part I identifies the nature of 
the problem with which the study is concerned. The stUdy's goal is stated 
and the study methodology described. Part II applies a systems approach 
to what is referred to as the environmental impact assessment and review 
process (EIARP). The goals, structure and function of this process and 
its links with the surrounding social and institutional environment are 
analyzed, and a normative framework of the EIARP is developed. Part III 
analyzes New Zealand's Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures 
and presents an evaluation of their effectiveness by reference to the 
normative model developed in Part II. The final chapter summarizes the 
findings of the study concerning the nature of the EIARP" both internationally 
and in New Zealand. 
1.1 DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
perceiving the nature of three phenomena, and recognizing the significance 
of the links between them, constitute an understanding of the nub of the 
problem. 
2. 
The three phenomena are environmental change, decision-making, and development. 
Environmental change simply describes the changing state of the physical 
world surrounding individuals and societies. Decision-making is defined 
here as the political process through which collective social values are 
brought to bear on the nature of development activities contemplated. 
Development describes the complex of social and economic changes that are 
brought about for certain ends by individuals or societies. 
1 1 I 
r Decision-making :~--------~~ Development i~------------~ Environmental 
change 
----'il>;. affective linkage 
Figure 1 Connections 
Much environmental change takes place without the influence of human societies. 
Large scale hydrological and geological processes are obvious examples. 
certain changes in the environment are the consequence of decision-making and 
development processes, which in turn may be affected by environmental change. 
Many of these changes have adverse or limiting effects on the welfare of 
societies; for example, air and water pollution and the depletion of natural 
resources. Such changes may affect welfare by reducing the social benefits 
which development activities are intended to bring, and they may foreclose 
possible options for future development. In general terms, the problem lies 
in recognizing that guidance of decision-making and development is needed 
so that adverse or limiting environmental change is taken into account. The 
problem then unfolds into the question of the design of such guidance and 
its success. 
A number of important dimensions of the problem require expansion. Firstly, 
social perceptions of the nature and significance of the problem outlined 
have implications for the design and effectiveness of measures instituted 
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for its solution. There is support for the general validity of this 
observation (e.g. Mannheim, 1940; Friedmann, 1978; Cartwright, 1973). As an 
example, environmental impact assessment is commonly referred to as an 
"environmental protectiori If acti vi ty. 
Environmental "protection" implies a number of pejorative ideas. The 
environment is seen as a personified and passive recipient of damaging actions 
wrought by development. Also, there is a necessary ethical stance of 
favouring "non-development" over development. The implications for the 
design of environmental protection measures are that knowledge of all 
significant environmental changes is av?ilable and can be ranged in battle. 
against development interests to prevent the environment's destruction. 
In these terms, the effectiveness of environmental protection activities 
is pre-destined to failure, as the environment is not passive, and environ-
mental change itself or the likelihood of change can influence decision-
making and development through pre-existing technical, economic and 
political processes. Furthermore, development as defined is an historically 
continuous human activity with a CUltural imperative borne of a minimum need 
for continued existence. Finally, the belief that scientific information 
can be used conclusively and effectively, to guide and control development, 
represents a simplistic view of the complexities of decision-making. 
This interpretation is stated in order to point out the potency of ruling 
perceptions in current environmental management activities. Holling (1978) 
develops this theme further by listing and progressively examining twelve 
plausible "myths" about the nature and purpose of environmental management 
and assessment. 
A second characterization of the problem is that however the problem is 
perceived, there remain two fundamental concerns that any strategy for its 
solution must recognize. 
TECHNICAL CONCERNS 
Technical concerns describe the inherent limitations in the state of objective 
knowledge about the environment and environmental change. The physical 
reality that surrounds individuals and societies may be observed and 
explained through scientific effort. Development des provides a more 
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or less deterministic statement of actions comtemplated. Predictions of 
environmental change either caused by development or independent of human 
actions may be made on the basis of available technical information. Two 
features of this information combine to present the most significant technical 
concern - that of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty exists firstly because the domain of existing knowledge of specific 
physical, ecological and social systems is much smaller than that which is 
unknown. Existing knowledge refers to both data and understanding of data. 
Secondly, not only is available information limited, but also most is 
probabilistic in nature. The complex, historically and spatially linked and 
non-linear behaviour of environmental systems places inherent limitations 
on the accuracy of predictions of environmental change (Bennett and Chorley, 
1978; Holling, 1978). Predictions are thus probability-magnitude ·estimates. 
An impact is an estimate in which the probability function is assumed to 
approach certainty, and it is the magnitude that is subject to evaluation. 
This is in contrast to the concept of risk, where the probability function 
of a future state assumes importance (Whyte and Burton, 1980; National 
Research Council, 1980). These concepts are described further in Chapter 3. 
Further technical concerns add to uncertainty. What is known and understood 
affects perceptions of what is relevant. Conversely, what is unknown about 
possible environmental change is unexpected and may be ignored in the design 
of development policies (Holling, 1978). This situation may have significant 
implications for the nature of environmental change as a consequence of a 
development activity. The location and form of existing information may 
constrain its relevance, availability and reliability. Generation of 
information is a cost as well as a benefit (O'Hare, 1980) and the inherent 
constraints in generating new information (time, money, effort) may increase 
to the point where information is both unavailable and practically unobtainable 
(Gelpe and Tarlock, 1974). 
Further, O'Hare (1980) argues that uncertainties in the use and ultimate 
value of information (whether existing or new) arise from its complex 
properties. Qualitative and quantitative measures of information are very 
indirectly related to its actual use in decision-making. This is because 
of inherent uncertainties concerning social perceptions of the value of 
particular information (op.cit.). 
uncertainty is therefore a self-limiting condition for decision-making. 
Difficulties with the reliability, relevance, availability and use of 
factual knowledge severely bound rational decision-making. 
apart from the added influence of social values or norms. 
NORMATIVE CONCERNS 
This is quite 
A discussion of normative concerns can conveniently begin with the demon-
stration by the economist Kenneth Arrow (1951) of the logical impossibility 
of defining a social welfare function (an economic view of general welfare) 
from the collective valuations qf individuals in a society. Values in 
society differ, and, if allowed democratic expression, may give rise to a 
plurality of individual or collective goals. Given that the perception of 
a problem is a function of social values or goals, the significance of a 
problem will be viewed differently by those in society who are oriented 
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towards differing goals. Hufschmidt (1971) views a social welfare function 
as being made up of "complementary and antagonistic" goals. Public policy 
is then an operative or instrumental expression of conflicting social values. 
Hufschmidt thus describes mUltiple-objective policy-making and planning as 
the relating of the plurality of social goals, such as environmental quality, 
economic growth, social equity and public health and safety. Decision-
making uses the multiple objectives of public policy in the evaluation of 
development activities. Resulting developments therefore reflect the agreed 
or imposed application of a particular set of social values, arising as a 
trade-off between' competing. goals (Bailey, 1975). Hence a strategy for the 
guidance of decision-making and development toward the end or goal of 
"environmental quality" (to use Hufschmidt's term) must be seen as being one 
of a number of social objectives. 
Normative concerns therefore arise in that the perception of the problem and 
the design of a strategy for its solution is itself a no~ative imperative. 
The Ultimate ends or goals of the strategy must compete in the decision-
making process with the implicit valuation of other social goals. 
In western capitalist democracies the ruling normative basis for decision-
making is described by welfare economic theory, albeit in rationalist terms 
(Lall, 1976; Wilson, 1977). A brief outline of the normative assumptions 
of welfare economics will serve to highlight specific normative concerns 
for an environmental management strategy. 
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Welfare economic theory both explains and endorses the market economic 
system of western democracies (op. cit.). The market system operates under 
a set of institutionalized values. One fundamental value is that the 
personal wants of individuals in society should guide the use of society's 
resources (Kneese, 1977). It is therefore assumed that social welfare 
can be achieved by maximising the efficiency of the exchange of resources 
according to individual preferences. In market economies, the competitive, 
decentralized valuing of resources by pricing, is the mechanism by which 
economically efficient production and consumption (resource exchange) develops. 
Market imperfections exist, in that not all resources can be exchanged (i.e. 
not all resources are individually owned); producers and consumers do not 
have complete information about the nature, ownership and valuation of 
resources within the market; and hence markets are never completely 
competitive. However, allowing for such imperfections, welfare economic 
theory aims. at what is called Pareto optimality, or the maximization of 
efficiency of resource exchange, in accordance with the above value·. A 
further fundamental assumption is that the satisfaction of individual wants 
(utility) is directly determined by the use of market resources. A 
corollary of this is that the maximization of individual utility is achieved 
by maximising resource exchange in accordance with the Pareto criterion of 
efficiency. The social welfare function which in theory becomes the 
decision-making objective is thus an aggregation of individual utilities. 
Welfare economic theory does not account for the original or developing 
distribution of exchange rights (equity of resource ownership) . 
able to fully account for externalities. 
Nor is it 
Externalities are unpriced, external effects on· individual or collective 
welfare that result from, but are external to, production-consumption systems 
(Baumol and Oates, 1975). Environmental changes such as the polluting 
effects of residuals dispersal (e.g. Kneese and Bower, 1968) and related 
effects on public ("common property") resources (e.g. Krutilla and Fisher, 
1975) are examples of externalities. Welfare economic theory recognizes 
externalities as social costs arising from market imperfections. However, 
because the market system of resource allocation cannot provide pricing 
information for public resources, the evaluation of external effects and 
adjustment within the market (internalizing of externalities) is theoretically 
impossible. 
In practice, market economies are severely modified from the normative model 
outlined above. Complex institutional adjustments are made to redistribute 
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resources and ownershi~ rights, and to reprice resources whose social value 
is not reflected in market prices. Policy instruments in the form of legal 
sanctions, taxes, subsidies and compensations may provide monetary controls 
of non-market (external) effects. The mix of market forces and state 
controls for the allocation of resources reflects the strength of the normative 
imperative of welfare economic theory in decision-making. 
DIMENSIONS OF A STRATEGY 
The character of the problem has implications for the development of a 
strategy. The development of a strategy must take intQ account its 
normative basis, that is, the ends or goals towards which the strategy is 
directed. It must reflect an understanding of the substantive nature of the 
problem - the potentially adverse and limiting effects of development 
activities on environmental systems. There must be an appreciation of the 
limitations of technical knowledge concerning such systems, and finally 
there should be an understanding of the character and influence of the 
institutionalized values or norms which currently guide decision-making 
and development. 
The term environmentaZ management can be used to collectively describe such 
strategies. The scope of envirornnental management is therefore inherently 
broad. It encompasses the social processes of policy-making and planning 
and the activities of many public and private institutions, as key elements 
in decision-making and development (see Chapter 2). 
Environmental management is thus distinct from the conventional concept of 
management at the level of a single institution, where .ends and means are 
usually specific and agreed upon. In environmental management mUltiple 
social values residing in public policies and the behavioural norms 
of institutions are continually confronted with knowledge about the nature 
of environmental change. The adjustments made in decision-making and 
development processes constitute what I term a macro-management process. 
Resource management is also a macro-management process. Here the focus is on 
culturally perceived resources as tangible or intangible elements of an 
environmental system. As the "envirorunent" is usually perceived as a 
"resource" the two processes cover a similar scope. 
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1. 2 STUDY GOAL 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a centr"al element of an environmental 
management strategy, which is the subject of this study. EIA has emerged 
in many western countries within the last fifteen years (most notably in 
the united States) as: 
" .•. an activity designed to identify and predict the impact on the 
biogeophysica1 environment and on man's health and wellbeing of 
legislative proposals, policies, programmes, projects, and 
operational procedures, and to interpret and communicate infor-
mation about the impacts." 
(Munn, 1979). 
The problem of divergence between the intent and practice of EIA has 
generated an enormous body of international literature. Much of this 
literature has concentrated on the US experience of implementing EIA as a 
procedural requirement of the National Environmerital Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) , 
and with the development of EIA methodologies. Critical analyses have 
focussed on the nature and effectiveness of EIA as a policy instrument (e.g. 
Wandesforde-Smith, 1977); as a planning tool (e.g. pearlman, 1977); or as 
an institutional adjustment (e.g. Andrews, 1976; Fairfax and Ingram, 1981). 
The New Zealand Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (EPEP) 
are a set of procedures administered by the Commission for the Environment, 
a government agency established by Cabinet Minute in August 1972. Since 
that time, approximately 90 individual development proposals have been 
formally documented under the EPEP, chiefly as Environmental Impact Reports 
(EIRs) and Environmental Impact Audits. The Procedures have been amended 
twice since their inception (1978, 1981). ~he design, operations and 
effectiveness of the EPEP have been subject to limited critical analysis. 
Mills (1979 a,b,c) has provided a detailed legal analysis of the EPEP, which 
is now somewhat dated. Morgan (1981) summarizes the current extent of 
research and commentary. 
This study is an attempt to synthesize international understanding of EIA 
and the processes with which it is linked, and to apply the results to an 
understanding of the New Zealand situation. Accordingly, the study goal 
is to develop an understanding of the nature, purpose and effectiveness 
of environmental impact assessment and related activities, in New Zealand 
and internationally. 
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1. 3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The complexity and scope of analysis needed to develop an understanding of 
EIA activities demands an holistic approach. Because of this, I have 
adopted a systems view and have developed a number of deductive models. The 
framework described in the first part of Chapter 1 is the first of such 
models. The models are iteratively derived from, and confronted with an 
examination of international and New Zealand experiences in EIA activities. 
While a key objective of developing models has been to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these .activities, causal explanation, or understanding 
remains the goal of the study. 
There are several wa~s of viewing the effectiveness of an institutional 
process. EIA is the central element in a process which is described in 
part II as the environmental impact assessment and review process (EIARP). 
The study is initially directed towards an understanding of -the inter-
national context of the EIARP, the substantive intent and the problems in 
practice. A critical appraisal of the New Zealand EIARP and its effective-
ness follows. In the context of this study, effectiveness is the 
relationship between the goal of a process and the substantive outcome of 
the process. A process involving EIA that is directed towards an environ-
mental management goal may be said to be substantially effective if it can 
be objectively shown that (i) environmental conditions tend toward the goal 
anq (ii) a causal connection exists between the process and the state of 
the environment. Note however, that the existence of a connection does not 
prescribe the nature of the instrumental means, i.e. the structure and 
function of the process. The influence and direction that the process may 
exert on decision-making may not be a direct consequence of its formal 
structure and functioning. 
There are insunnountable "real world" problems with demonstrating substantial 
effectiveness. 'rhe normative nature of such a process means that in a 
world of conflicting social values there will never be agreement on the 
significance of the substantive effects of the process, in terms of the 
goal being sought. Environmental quality commonly describes the goal of 
the EIARP, among other environmental management processes. Environmental 
quality is at once an enormously complex and abstract concept. The 
objective characterization of the nature of environmental change in order to 
show a trending toward this desired end becomes an intractable problem. 
Comprehensive information about social conditions and the state of ecological 
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and physical systems is needed. No selection of qualitative or quantitative 
variables for use as indicators of the changing state of the environment can 
ever adequately express the totality or the ultimate subjectivity of environ-
mental quality. This is not to say, however, that selected environmental 
quality "indicators" cannot be used to track certain environmental conditions. 
Air and water quality monitoring and assessment can establish trends in 
pollution resulting from specific or regional industrial developments (e.g. 
see Annual Reports of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). But the general us'e of natural 
resources - natural landscapes, energy, minerals, and so on - generates 
complex mixes of social benefits and costs spread through space and time. 
The evaluation of these mixes in terms of environmental quality is object-
ively irresolvable. Evaluation methods of welfare economics analyze 
benefits and costs of development only througF the use of monetary measures. 
Incornrnensurables, intangibles and externalities remain a central problem 
of social cost-benefit analysis, as a normative framework for guiding 
development (e.g. Krutilla and Fisher, 1975; Pearce, 1976). 
An environmental management process may be used to guide the evaluation 
of developments. However, the substantive outcome of its use will always 
be subject to disagreement because of competing social goals, and it can 
never be adequately and objectively characterized. 
EffectiVeness may be analyzed in a way that is less bedevilled by the above 
philosophical and methodological problems. Instead of attempting to assess 
the substantive outcomes of a process, the functional relationship between 
the goal and the instrumental means (i.e. the structure and function of 
the process) can be examined and evaluated. This requires the adoption of 
a normative stance (i.e. accepting the goals as posited) and the making of 
deductions about the nature of the decision-making system within which the 
process operates. 
Therefore, functional effectiveness is the relationship between the goals 
of a process and the way the process is designed and implemented within 
a social and institutional setting. A directed process is functionally 
effective if it can be shown that (i) the nature of decision-making is 
influenced by the process in accordance with process goals, and that (ii) 
this influence is because of the structure and the function of the process. 
Functional effectiveness is a proximate demonstration of the substantial 
effectiveness of a process. 
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In a functional effective EIARP, the strength of the link between the goals 
of the process and the substantive nature of decision-making is the result 
of the positive structure and function of the process, within its social and 
institutional envirorunent. A normative model of the EIARP can then be 
developed deductively from general experience with the EIARP. This model 
may be used as a basis for the evaluation of the functional effectiveness 
of a particular process. 
My application of deductive modelling to the study is based on the conviction 
that social and institutional systems are amenable to understanding in the 
same way as natural systems (e.g. Holling and Goldberg, 1971). What 
distinguishes these two fields of enquiry is the need to explicitly account 
for normative (i.e. valuing) premises in an analysis of social and 
institutional systems. A good swrunary of the logic and use of deductive 
modelling in policy analysis can be found ·in Nagel and Neef (1979). 
Part II of the study uses a systems approach to: 
(i) identify the goal or goals of the EIARP; 
(ii) place the EIARP within its social and institutional environment; 
(iii) determine the nature of the links between the EIARP and the 
larger system; 
(iv) rationally examine the structure and function of the EIARP required 
to direct the system toward the goal or goals; and 
(v) develop a normative model of the EIARP as a deductive synthesis 
of the process. 
Part III describes and evaluates the New Zealand EIARP with reference to 
the normative model developed in part II. The soundness of this evaluation 
is bounded by the goals of the EIARP, the robustness of the normative model 
and the understanding of the New Zealand situation. 
PART II 
CHAPTER Two ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter develops an analytical framework for the process of decision-
making and the environmental impact assessment and review process. 
Decision-making is viewed as an essentially political process operating 
through time, in which technical knowledge and collectivized varues are 
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brought to bear on the nature of development contemplated. Decision-making 
is therefore a cultural process in which culturally defined resources are 
allocated for devel~pment. Development describes the social and economic 
changes resulting from the allocation and use of these resources. 
2.1 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The framework for decision-making consists of elements, their linkages and a 
complex of behavioural processes. The elements are institutions (as 
purposive organizational entities), both public and private, and the public 
at large. Institutions are political - the executive, parliament; legal -
the judiciary; and administrative - the government agencies at central level, 
and regional and local agencies with delegated management functions. Economic 
enterprises are also institutions and may be public or private. Finally, 
the public at large participates in decision-making, not only through the 
formal political system, but also through the influences of interest groups. 
Key links withiri the decision-making process are political controls,public 
laws and administrative behaviour as institutional rules; and social norms. 
In addition, significant influences on public decision-making may arise from 
the actions of political institutions and economic enterprises of other 
countries. 
Policy-making and planning are two closely related social processes that 
influence and direct the decision-making process. Each is ultimately 
concerned with the adjustment of social values following collective action 
as a response to perceived problems. 
Policy-making is a political process in an overt or proximate sense. Central 
level political and administrative institutions are primarily involved in 
the formulation, implementation and review of a wide range of intents for 
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collective action. Many other institutions influence public policy-making, 
including political parties and economic enterprises. Policy-making is also 
influenced by the public at large, through established political linkages. 
some public policy is translated into public laws, to be administered by the 
judiciary through established legal processes. other public policy resides 
in either the formalized or the ad hoc intents, or behavioural influences, 
of political and administrative institutions. 
Planning is a covert, or ultimately political process, operating through the 
same elements and influences within society as policy-making. The scope 
of planning is inherently broad. While there is n~ generally accepted 
model of the planning process, a survey of current planning theory recognizes 
planning as a social process linking knowledge and action (Friedmann and 
Hudson, 1974). Therefore, its scope encompasses the iterative links between 
decision-making, development and environmental change (see Figure 1). 
Planning may be seen as a conceptual basis for the policy-making process. 
Public policy is the political vehicle for the continuing adjustment of 
competing social goals (as ultimate ends) and objectives (as instrumental 
means) (Young, 1966; Hufschmidt~ 1971). 
I 
The following framework shows the conceptual nature of decision-making as a 
policy-making and a planning process. 
Figure 2 Framework for the decision-making process. 
~ ~. ~ ~ ~ I 
Social Knowledge Problem Strategy 
~ ~ ~ ~ Decision r Action 
values of reality definition development 
This framework is adapted from a theory of social practice developed by 
Friedmann (1978) and shows the key determinants of the nature of decisions. 
The iterative nature of the process reflects th~ constant adjustment of 
social ends and means through the consequences of social action (i.e. 
development) . 
As a generalized description, the decision-making process runs along these 
lines. Policy arises at central level political and administrative 
institutions in response to perceived problems. Technical info~~ation and 
social norms are combined in the generation of a range of strategies. The 
evaluation of strategies takes place through a variety of influences from 
political, administrative, economic and social institutions. Decisions are 
made at executive level in political and administrative institutions, and 
may be implemented by administrative or economic concerns. The assessement 
and review of public policy becomes an iterative process within decision-
making, in response to further problems (Lindblom, 1980). 
The particular links and activities of social and institutional elements in 
decision-making may vary, depending upon what Q'Riordan and Sewell (1981) 
call the "national political cUlture". This refers to the specific 
procedures, and behavioural modes operating within the policy-making and 
planning processes of a society. 
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2.2 THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW PROCESS 
It is within this social and institutional environment that an EIARP as an 
environmental management strategy is developed and implemented. The 
formulation of environmental management policy, and the conception of an 
EIARE as a planning process, are fundamental influences on the structure 
and function of an ElARP. As will be argued in Chapter 3, the normative 
basis, scope and focus of environmental management policy ("environmental 
policy"), and the relationship of the EIARP with existing planning processes 
("environmental planning") are key determinants of the influences of an 
ElARP on decision-making. 
However, there is an equally significant feedback influence on the nature 
and effects of an EIARP, from its operations within the decision-making 
process. O'Riordan and Sewell (1981) consider that the "national political 
culture" of decision-making may determine Whether feedback influences are 
self-regulating or self-enhancing. In other words, the implementation of 
an EIARP may be a self-limiting exercise, or else it may increase its 
effectiveness through its continued operations. This proposition has been 
examined from both perspectives for the federal U.S. process under NEPA 
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(e.g. Dreyfus and Ingram, 1976; Fairfax, 1978; Caldwell, 1979); the federal 
Canadian process (Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process 
(FEARP)); (e.g. Rees, 1980) and the Australian federal and state processes 
(e.g. Formby, 1981). Chapter 3 develops discussion on the mutual influences 
of policy, planning and the EIARP. 
Figure 3 models the key formative influences of the EIARP. 
Decision-making process 
Environmental Environmental 
management policy management planning 
E I A R P 
Figure 3 The environmental impact assessment and review process 
and links with decision-making. 
Analysis of the ElARE is aided by a generally useful conceptual device: the 
separation of substantive from procedural elements within the process. The 
separation is to some extent arbitrary, as each element has a complex blend 
of both substantive and procedural aspects (Chapter 3). Substantive 
elements are those which relate most strongly to the ultimate purpose or 
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of the process. Procedural elements are purposive in a proximate 
sense, and relate more to the way the process is organized. The interaction 
of substantive and procedural elements describes the structure and function 
of the ElARE within its social and institutional environment. 
Social and institutional 
environment 
Policy context 
participants, 
actions and 
decisions 
Planning context 
Substantive elements Procedural elements 
Figure 4 The environment impact assessment and review process 
The fundamental substantive elements are the iterative ElA and review 
processes. Successive ElA and review actions operate throughout the 
decision-making process in order to substantively influence that process. 
The policy and planning contexts of the ElARE strongly influence the nature of 
these iterations. Procedural elements are derived from the environment of 
the ElARE in the form of an institutional framework (legal, political, 
administrative and economic institutions) and the public at large (including 
individuals and interest groups). These elements constitute the procedural 
elements of participants (the actors), actions and decisions. The following 
chapter develops the framework for the ElARE in more detail. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER THREE : THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW PROCESS 
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The environmental ~mpact assessment and review process (EIARP) is the term 
by which I refer to the more or less formalized institutional procedure which 
has been-developed in many western countries within the past two decades. 
The process is usually referred to as EIA; I have explicitly added the 
review component to the term so that it more accurately represents the 
substantive nature of the process. 
The principal intended function of the EIARP is to influence the decision-
making process through a systematic assessment of the likely environmental 
consequence of development designs or options. The scope of influence 
and the structure of the EIARP varies greatly between the countries in which 
the process operates. Development proposals for consideration may be 
broadly conceived as policies, plans or prograrnrnesas well as specific 
projects. Conceptions of the "environment" and "environmental impact" 
have similarly ranged from completely unfocussed definitions to explicitly 
defined categories of relevance or significance. Despite the difficulties 
,in identifying the actual influences on institutional behaviour (Andrews, 
1976; USCEQ, 1976), the nature of the influence of an EIARP on particular 
decision-making systems appears to be variable (O'Riordan and Sewell, 1981). 
In order to understand the cornmon threads of the EIARP, I will briefly 
describe its origins, and developments in ideas about its use. 
ORIGINS 
The nature and scale of post-war industrialism in western countries has 
resulted in often dramatic effects on the natural environment. By the 
1960s there was a heightened awareness that the environment was an entity 
vulnerable to destructive influences of economic activities, and was also 
worthy of vigorous protection (Caldwell, 1970). The development of public 
policy on the environment and environmental protection in the United States 
CUlminated in the now renowned and exhaustively analyzed Federal statute, 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 
NEPA created the first formal ElARP, and American experience has tended to 
become a model for others when deciding whether and how to design their own 
(Wandesforde-Smith, 1980a). NEPA provided a comprehensive 
statement of national environmental policy and set out substantive goals on 
which the policy was based (U.S. Public Law 91-190 Section 101) . Section 
102, now an historic procedural provision, required the preparation of a 
statement on the "environmental impacts" of certain development proposals: 
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment". This requirement for an environmental impact statement (ElS) 
was designed to force action consistent with an in fulfilment of the policy 
goals (Liroff, 1976). 
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The EIS requirement in NEPA generated much professional, administrative and 
public interest and controversy (e.g. Andrews, 1976; Dreyfus and Ingram 1976). 
The brevity of the provision and the opportunities for judicial review 
resulted in litigation which forced the U.S. judiciary to interpret NEPA 
(Anderson, 1973). A six year review of NEPA's operations by the advisory 
agency set up under the Act, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 
analyzed the effectiveness of the ElS process (USCEQ, 1976). It found that 
the most commonly litigated questions concerned the circumstances under 
which an ElS was required, and the constitution of an adequate EIS. Five 
percent of all Federal EISs prepared over that period were actually 
challenged in court. Chief criticisms were that voluminous paperwork of 
limited influence in decision-making and significant delays in proposal 
implementation resulted from the ElS process (op. cit.). 
Informal guidelines were twice issued in the early 1970s (USCEQ , 1971; 1973) 
in an attempt to clarify and regularize requirements. These were translated 
into formal regUlations in 1978 (USCEQ, 1978), following extensive agency and 
public consultation. The regulations incorporated judicial interpretations 
of NEPA and were principally aimed at reducing paperwork and delays, and 
producing better decisions (op. cit.). Current indications of their 
effectiveness are scant; but one critical analysis of the U.S. experience 
considers that they provide an increased potential for administrative 
effectiveness (Fairfax and Ingram, 1981). 
However, as noted by Wandesforde-Smith (1980a), administrative (i.e. 
functional) effectiveness must be judged in the light of the held, and 
the outcomes of an EIARP, seen within the context of the particular decision-
making process and the set of "political and administrative conditions that 
EIA is in part intended to change". 
With this awareness not always in mind, the U.S. experience with EIA became 
a model for examination and variable adoption at federal and state levels 
in many western countries, notably Canada, Australia, New Zealand, West 
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Germany and other European states. The diversity in the design and operation 
of EIARPS in these countries reflects the character of environmental policy 
development and of the formal planning process in each country, as well 
as the particular institutional framework for environmental management. Local 
problem definitions hav~ increasingly framed the design an EIARP rather 
than a slavish adherence to the O.S. model (Wandesforde-Smith, 1980b). 
In the U.s. EIA is considered primarily as a policy instrument in the absence 
of integrated planning processes at local, state and national levels 
(Wandesforde-Smith, 1977; Pearlman, 1977; Clark, Chapman, Bisset and Wathern, 
1978). By contrast, other countries, particularly some European states, 
consider the chief function of an EIA process to be a tool of land-use and 
development planning. In most countries, EIA has been confined to the 
assessment of major projects, as a means of improving assessment and of 
designing mitigation measures (Wandesforde-Smith, 1980b). 
In countries where there is a structured system of local, urban and regional 
planning (e.g. Britain) there has been lengthy critical scrutiny of the value 
of a formalized EIARP integrated with the established planning process 
(O'Riordan, 1981; Clark, Bisset and Wathern, 1981; Lee and Wood, 1978; 1980). 
Reluctance to adopt a broadly based EIARP, or a process at all, is based 
on the assertion that some functional equivalent of EIA is already in place 
within the current institutional framework for planning. This assertion is 
countered with the argument that formalized planning processes are procedurally 
weak in the assessment of the implications of specific developments. The 
integration of an EIARP with land-use planning activities is thus considered 
to significantly improve their effectiveness (Catlow and Thirlwall, 1976; 
Lichfield and Marinov, 1977). A recent example of an attempt to integrate 
EIA with an "environmental" planning process is the New South Wales' statute, 
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979 (Bosward and Staveley, 
1981) . 
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GOALS 
The existence of the EIARP in all its variant forms makes it difficult to 
clearly identify the universal ends or goals of the process. General aims 
of the EIARP are either given in operative or instrumental terms (e.g. that 
given for EIA by Munn (1979» or as abstract expressions of ultimate direction 
(e.g. "environmental quality"). 
I have conceptualized the EIARP as an environmental management strategy; an 
instrumental means directed towards management goals. The aims of environ-
mental management activities are usually briefly referred to in implicitly 
normative terms, for example, "proper" or "sound" management; but what 
exactly is "proper" or "sound"? 
The beginnings of an answer to this question can be found in the generic 
distinction between environmental management goals and other currently 
conceptualized social goals. This distinction is the explicit concern for 
society-environment interactions in environmental management activities, 
whereas many social aspirations have no wider focus (e.g. economic growth). 
In other words, the goals of environmental management centre around the need 
to continually adjust social goals (manifest through development) to the 
nature of environmental change resulting from development. 
Expressions such as environmental quality are directed towards a conjunction 
of all social goals with an understanding and a valuing of environmental 
systems in man's continued existence. 
in NEPA is an exhortation: 
For example, the policy statement 
"to use all practicable means ••• to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony." (NEPA of 1969 s.101(a». 
This statement represents an attempt at the time by American society to infuse 
the normative imperative of a social goal (economic development) with a broader 
perspective (Dreyfus and Ingram, 1976). 
What, then, may be deduced about the objectives, or the instrumental go.als of 
environmental management in order to identify a precise normative basis for 
the EIARP? There are at least two fundamental criteria derivable from a 
knowledge of the society-environment system and from the normative basis of 
environmental management. 
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The first criterion is comprehensiveness. At a social level, decision-making 
must consider development options which represent the range of social values 
that may dictate a strategy. Social conflict is inevitable if development 
design (as policies or as projects) is creatively impoverished. At a 
broader level, comprehensive understanding is needed of likely environmental 
change induced by development, especially change considered to be significant 
in the light of current social values. 
An operative goal of the EIARP is, therefore, to encourage the development of 
a comprehensive strategy, in terms of both the range of designs or options 
considered, and the breadth of understanding of environmental change implied 
by each option. 
The second criterion is derived from an appreciation of the nature of social 
learning. Social learning is essentially an iterative process. Constant 
adjustments in technical and social knowledge are made through inducing, 
responding to and learning from environmental change. The development of 
empirical science and the historical evolution of political (and economic) 
systems are good examples of this process. The iterative nature of social 
practice is seen in the decision-making process, in policy-making, and in 
planning; all of which are variant conceptualizations of the same reality. 
Therefore, "proper" or "sound" management, whether "economic" or "environ-
mental" in scope, is seen not in particular problem-solving successes, but 
rather in the general effectiveness of the process of adjustment. In the 
words of Holling et al. (1978), this is the "adaptiveness" of management. 
A further objective of the EIARP is therefore, to encourage the iterative 
design, assessment and review of development proposals as part of an ongoing, 
dynamic, political process. As Holling argues, this necessarily means a 
flexible, adaptive approach to development design, where the assessment and 
choice of options are responsive to changes in technical knowledge and in 
social objectives which may have stimulated the development. 
Further criteria for identifying the normative basis of the EIARP spring from 
an understanding of the variety of relationships that exist between the 
process and its social and institutional environment. These normative 
criteria are deduced from an examination of substantive and procedural aspects 
of the EIARP discussed further on. 
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PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
A generalised model of the structure of the EIARP has been developed following 
an examination of federal and state processes in a number of countries, in 
particular the U.S., Canada, Australia and Britain. The structure of the 
process describes the say the process is carried out. It is the pattern of 
connections between participants (actors), actions and decisions. Each 
actor-action-decision linkage has both substantive and procedural aspects 
(Chapter 2). 
Figure 5 is a structural model of the EIARP. At least four substantive 
iterations of EIA and review processes can be identified. The first iteration 
is an initial process which establishes the need for further assessment of 
a proposed development action. The second iteration defines the scope and 
undertakes what is usually a single EIA, which is then reviewed. The third 
iteration represents the constitutionally defined process of executive 
decision and judicial review. Here, political, administrative and legal 
influences are finally brought to bear on the development proposal as the 
"decision" element of the decision-making process (Figure 2). The fourth 
iteration is generally poorly developed in operative EIARPs. Most processes 
cease formally influencing decision-making after the implementation of the 
development. Fragmented elements of the institutional framework for environ-
mental management may undertake monitoring of mitigation measures legally 
required (e.g. pollution controls). Monitoring results may cause the continued 
operation of the development action to be adjusted. However, monitoring 
activities may be weakly integrated, and their collective effects on the 
development-environmental change linkage (Figure 1) are generally not 
significant (Holling, 1978). 
The identity of the actors involved in particular action-decision linkages 
varies greatly. The range of actors usually encountered in the EIARP 
is as follows (Munn, 1979): 
(i) The Proponent (initiator) of an action (any conceptualized development 
proposal) . The proponent may be a public or private organization, in the 
sense of being a political or administrative institution, a non-goverrunent 
economic enterprise, or an amalgam of the two. A goverrunent agency may act 
as the proponent on behalf of a private enterprise. 
Figure 5 structural model of the environmental impact assessment 
and review process. 
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The assessor is the person or organization 
bl for carrying out EIAs. In most respons i e 
EIARPs , the 
. functionally equivalent to the proponent, or else an assessor 
assessor 1.S 
t on behalf of a proponent. may ac-
(iii) The Reviewer. The reviewer is the person or or ly 
responsible for reviewing EIAs. The reviewer is usual i 
the proponent or assessor, and several actors usual take 
from 
activit).es. 
(iv) Central" regional w1.d local goverrtment 
have a wide vari:2)t:y of resource management 
have an interest in the action. They may 
to the proponent, assessor and reviewer. 
These institutions 
lities, and thus may 
list kno''''ledge 
24. 
(v) Specialist advisors. These may be from ic or private organizations, 
providing techni:al and scientific information to all the above actors. 
(vi) The public, including individuals and interest groups affected by or 
otherwi~e interested in the action. Usual I the c is invol7ed in the 
second and third substantive iterations of the EIARP (Figure 5) . The public 
provides a range of infol~ation to the 1 assessor, revi~"'er and 
decision-maker, especially that concerning the social valuation, or the 
significance, of predicted environmental ts. The public may legally 
challenge decision-making on the action. 
(vii) The decision-maker. This actor is not well named, as ther'~ is seldom 
a single person solely responsible for an executive decision on a proposed 
action. As Munn (1979) notes, executive decisions are "shaped" :ather than 
"made" I and ailictors in the EIARP influence the character of th,~ choices 
open to an executive 
(viii) The Legi.: (Parliament) . As the ultimate executive authority 
in a fOl.~al sense, Parliament may make executive decisions on major icies 
or projects. 
The courts may be required to undertake udicial 
reviews of actions or deci iOlls in the EIARP. Opportunities for udi 1 
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review are highly variable among EIARPs surveyed. The legal terms of 
reference of the EIARP are a key factor in this variation. 
(x) other governments with an interest in or influence on the action. 
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3.2 SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
"Scope of application" describes the range of types of actions which may fall 
within the ambit of any EIARP. A prescription of the scope of application 
of an EIARP is substantively important. Several interrelated questions arise 
immediately. ~fuat ought to be common to all actions to which an EIARP applies? 
How should the EIARP be integrated with the decision-making process for those 
actions not within its scope? What criteria should be used to initiate the 
application of an EIARP to actions which are within its scope? 
It is the anticipated environmental consequepces of actions, and perceptions 
regarding these consequences, that primarily determine the range and types 
of actions that an EIARP can be and is applied to. Thus. perceptions of 
"environment" and "significant impact" positively answer the last question 
above, and are examined further on. 
International experience has defined the scope of application by including 
or excluding certain classes of actions, firstly because of the relationship 
of the particular EIARP to policy-making and planning processes, and secondly 
through perceptions of environment and significant impact. Problems arising 
through the use of various selective approaches are summarized below. 
Development actions can be characterized by their scope of complexity (in 
time and space), their initiating origin, as well as by the specific nature of 
their consequences. Policies, plans and programmes are examples of actions 
having a generally broad scope of complexity. Projects are usually specifically 
defined physical development activities. Projects arise from a policy or a 
planning context as a sequential product of prior decision-making. This 
relationship between generic and specific levels (or "tiers") of actions is 
increasingly recognized as being substantively important in the design and 
operation of EIARPs (e.g. USCEQ, 1978; OECD, 1979; O'Riordan and Sewell, 1981; 
Lee, 1982). However, in practice it is ignored, as the use of the EIARP 
is pragmatically confined to a project-only scope in the U.S. (Wandesforde-
Smith, 1977; 1980a), Canada (Lucas, 1981), Australia (Fowler, 1981) and 
European states (Lee and Wood, 1978). 
The substantive problems of project-only EIA and review, as a reactive process 
of limited effectiveness are widely appreciated (e.g. Holling, 1978; Lee and 
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Wood, 1978; 1980; Proceedings, Workshop on Environmental Assessment, 
University of Melbourne, Australia, 1981 (various contributors». Policy and 
programme design largely predetermines the cumulative range and significance 
of possible environmental impacts. The assessment of design options is 
progressively foreclosed through the investment of political, administrative 
and economic effort, as generic level actions give rise to specific projects. 
Questions of timing, scope and integration with policy-making and planning 
processes arise whenever generic level EIAs are attempted. Procedural 
problems may be substantially overcome, provided there is substantive inter-
gration with the processes of policy-making and planning (Miller, Anderson, 
and Liroff, 1976; Pearlman, 1977; Wandesforde-Smith, 1977; 1980a). 
Actions may originate as generic or specific public proposals from policies 
to projects, or as private development proposals (usually projects only). 
EIARPS variable exclude one or the other of these classes of actions through 
the use of criteria such as public funding or legal consent requirements. 
While public actions are formulated and evaluated within public policy-making 
and planning processes, private actions are usually subject to a range of 
statutory planning controls (e.g. through land-use planning and pollution 
controls) . The exclusion of either class of action from the scope of an 
EIARP is based on the assumption that such processes can adequately formulate 
and evaluate development options. Fowler (1981) considers that while the 
inclusion of public proposals in an EIARP is substantively justifiable, there 
is a potential problem of integration between existing controls over private 
actions (as above) and an EIARP whose scope includes such actions. This is 
because the planning process for private proposals usually has an explicitly 
broad substantive scope and may also be considered as an environmental 
management strategy (e.g. Lee and Wood, 1978). However, substantive and 
procedural problems with planning processes in project assessment are 
recognized (Catlow and Thirlwall, 1976; Lichfield and Marinov, 1977; Bosward 
and Staveley, 1981; Chapter 3.2, The EIARP and Planning). 
A normative model for the scope of application of the EIARP includes all actions 
likely to have a significant environmental impact, regardless of their type, 
origin, or mode of approval or implementation (Lee and Wood, 1978). It thus 
encompasses the assessment and review of generic and specific level public 
and pr1vate actions, of a comprehensive range of designs. Any reduction in 
the breadth of this scope, in design or in practice, requires consideration 
of the substantive and procedural effectiveness of existing environmental 
management processes which formulate and evaluate development actions. 
DEFINITION OF ENVIRONMENT 
The formalized perceptions of "environment" and "significant impact" within 
the EIARP together define the operating criteria for any included action, 
and the resulting scope of the formal EIA activity (Figure 5). 
concepts are thus substantively important. 
These 
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What ought to be the scope of meaning of the term "environment"? Should this 
meaning be applied consistently to all activities undertaken within the EIARP? 
The concept of environment is inherently broad (literally, "that which surrounds"). 
If left undefined, its operational meaning remains vague and subject to variable 
interpretation. There is no common acceptance of an operational definition 
. 
in the U.S. (Andrews, 1978), Canada (Lucas, 1981) nor in Australia (Fowler, 
"1981). There is, however, a persistent, dual perception of environment, 
identified by Catlow and Thirlwall (1976). On one hand, environment is limited 
to the "natural" environment (Le. ecological and physical systems affecting 
and affected by individuals and societies). On the other hand, environment 
extends beyong. this conception to include with it, elements of the "human" 
environment (e.g. aesthetic, economic, health, social and cultural elements) . 
The EIARPs surveyed generally base operational definitions on one or the 
other of these scopes of meaning. While all see "environment", hence 
"environmental impacts", in terms of ecological and physical systems, not all 
include in practice social and cultural systems and associated changes. For 
example, the NEPA Regulations base their operative meaning on the more compre-
hensive concept of the "human environment" in NEPA (s .102 (2) (c) ). Environ-
mental "effects" therefore include ecological, aesthetic, historic, cultural, 
economic, social or health consequences, whether direct, indirect or cumulative 
(USCEQ, 1978). However, actions which generate solely "social" and "economic ll 
effects are outside the scope of the U.S. Federal EIARP. It is only when there 
are interrelated "natural" or "physical" environmental effects, that a com-
prehensive scope is required (op. cit.). 
But, as ecological science demonstrates, impacts on ecosystems and biogeo-
chemical cycles are intimately related through complex feedback mechanisms to 
social impacts and economic considerations. In other words, an action causing 
social and economic changes always has a nexus with environmental systems, 
The above example reflects institutional norms persisting within western 
countries that view economic activities as being essentially apart from 
reciprocal influences of the natural world. The normative structure of 
welfare economic theory and practice reinforces this perception (Wilson, 
1977; Chapter 1). 
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A normative perception of "environment" within the EIARP must remain compre-
hensive (e.g. Catlow and Thirlwall, 1976). However, the operational meaning 
may be influenced by the particular source of the environmental response (in 
a comprehensive sense) to a man-induced disturbance. For example, changes 
in employment and in other social conditions resulting from a development 
action, may not be proximately linked to changes in the natural and built 
environment caused by the same action (Lee, 1982). The scope of an EIA 
may be restricted to impacts on the natural and built environment, if social 
and/or economic (sensu striato) impact assessment is provided in a functionally 
equivalent way (op. cit.). While such fragmentation may attempt to be 
technically valid, it perpetuates the dual conception of environment and is 
normatively deficient in ways already outlined (see for example, Gold, 1978; 
Abel and Stocking, 1981). 
CRITERIA FOR OPERATION 
There are a number of criteria which may 'be used to determine whether a 
particular action (however abstractly conceived) is to be applied to the 
EIARP. These criteria bear on the "decision to screen" and the "decision 
on screening" at the first substantive iteration of the process (Figure 5). 
How should a proposed action be considered in order to determine whether 
and what assessment is needed within the EIARP? The first substantive 
criterion used is the defined scope of application of an EIARP (see above). 
Further substantive criteria applied as a triggering mechanism generally 
revolve around the concept of "significant impact" (Catlow and Thirlwall, 
1976). In practice, a mix of discretionary and prescriptive criteria based on 
this concept are applied to determine when and whether to screen an action, 
and whether to continue assessment. 
Whether discretionary or prescriptive and whoever decides on significance, the 
question of what is a significant impact is inherently normative. It raises 
questions concerning the objectives of an action, or its "need", whatever its 
scope of complexity or social origin, and the benefits and burdens of its 
The NEPA Regulations (USCEQ, 1978) attempt to develop a set of operational 
criteria concerning significance. These refer to the time-space context, 
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to the intensity of social valuing (in either beneficial or adverse terms) of 
impacts; as well as to a number of specific ecological or social cause-effect 
linkages. Others suggest equally discretionary criteria in terms of "diversity" 
and "complexity" (Catlow and Thirlwall, 1976). Some recently designed formal 
EIARPs have pragmatically developed prescriptive lists of specific types of 
actions, for which initial and/or continuing assessments are required. 
Examples exist in the proposed directive for EIA in the European Economic 
Community (Commission of the European Community, 1980), and the New South Wales 
EIARP, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979. 
deterministically assume significance of impacts. 
Such prescriptions 
There are no commonly accepted or enduring norms concerning the positive 
or technical aspects of significance of environmental invacts (i.e. their 
time-space and ecological or physical context) . Nor are there those concerning 
the normative or valuing aspects (i.e. political and social significance at 
local, regional or national levels (e.g. Andrews, 1978; Elliott, 1981». Thus, 
significance can only be judged in relation to the state of technical knowledge 
in all its uncertainty, and the perceived valuations in either beneficial or 
adverse terms, of likely impacts of conceptualized actions. Procedural 
questions of when the criteria concerning significance are applied to an action 
via screening, who decides what criteria are used, and how they are used, are 
all also of substantive importance. 
this chapter. 
THE EIA PROCESS 
These questions are further examined in 
The EIA process is a central substantive element of the EIARP. Successive 
EIA iterations vary greatly in procedural form and function; e.g. the 
"initial assessment" and "EIA" and "monitoring and assessment" (Figure 5). 
Note that the "executive decision" may be regarded abstractly as a highly 
condensed substantive equivalent of an EIA process. 
What is EIA? What ought to be its substantive nature and purpose in the light 
of the objectives of the EIARP? EIA is a procedural element of the decision-
making process in which an EIARP operates. Its recognized substantive purpose 
is a systematic assessment of environmental impacts of development designs or 
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options, in order to substantively influence decision-making concerning those 
designs. The above questions become: what does it mean to assess? What 
are environmental impacts? And what ought to be the nature of its influences 
on the decision-making process? These questions apply to all EIA iterations; 
however, the following discussion is mainly concerned with the formal "EIA" 
in the second substantive iteration (Figure 5). The normative framework 
developed, however, applies to all EIA processes in the EIARP. 
Because of its substantive scope, the EIA process has both technical and 
normative aspects, and is subject to all the technical and normative problems 
outlined in Chapter 1. The substantive nature of the EIA process may be 
examined by reference to current understanding of these aspects. 
Technical uncertainties inherent in EIA arise from the complexity, and the 
limited understanding and available information concerning environmental 
systems affected by development actions (Bennett and Chorley, 1978; Holling, 
1978). These uncertainties are recognized in the conception of environmental 
impacts as magnitude-probability estimates of the cause-effect linkages in 
those systems disturbed by human actions. The cause-effect-impact linkage 
describes impacts as predicted estimates of the consequences to society of 
physical-ecological-social disturbances and responses (Dooley, 1979; Munn, 
1979, National Research Council, 1980). In contrast, an environmental risk 
specifies the probabilistic element of an impact or set of impacts on 
society (Dooley, 1979; Whyte and Burton, 1980). Impacts and risks imply social 
valuation, through their effects on individuals or societies in a time-space 
context, in ways relevant or significant to those affected. 
Thus, both technical and normative aspects of the EIA process are implicit 
in the concept of assessment, where alternative actions and environmental 
impacts are iteratively identified, predicted and evaluated (Matthews, 1975; 
BacQw, 1980). Normative influences in the EIA process begin with the formulation 
of the objectives of a development proposal. They bear on the range and 
character of alternatives to the proposal which may be considered in practice 
(Bacow, 1980). The constraints of time, effort and information limit the 
scope of EIA (objectives, alternatives and environmental impacts) to what is 
considered relevant or significant by those actors involved (op. cit). This 
situation has forced the formal recognition of what is an implicitly 
evaluative process. "Scoping" is the name given to the procedure in which 
the scope of the formal EIA is defined prior to carrying out the EIA (Figure 5) 
(Chapter 3.3). The U.S. and Canadian Federal EIARPs notably incorporate 
such a procedure. 
Decision-makers require information that effectively discriminates between 
policy choices, in order to reconcile competing social goals (Friesema and 
Culhane, 1976, Elliot, 1981). The more analytic and comprehensive the 
EIA, the more complex the choice of option becomes, and, paradoxically, the 
less effective the process may be in substantively influencing decision-
making (Friesema, 1978, Elliot, 19B1). Therefore, many EIAs have attempted 
to quantify and amalgamate impact predictions and evaluations in order to 
present objective, synthetic choices for the decision-maker (Bisset, 1~78, 
1980a). Elliot (1981) and Lee (1982) describe the substantive problems 
inherent in combining and compressing technical and valuation~l information 
in quanti£ied, non-arbitrary ways. They argue that since questions of 
relevance and significance are objectively irresolvable, any amalgamation 
involves value-judgements. 
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The imposed or agreed social values of the actors in the ErA process are thus 
thoroughly combined with the technically derived information in the EIA. 
Explicit, operative criteria for defining and directing the ErA process are 
therefore difficult to deduce. 
A comprehensive and iterative approach is necessary, with explicit recognition 
of the reliability, relevance and significance of the information generated. 
Comprehensiveness requires a creative approach to the generation of alternative 
designs from the objectives of a~y proposed action (e.g. USCEQ, 1978; Holling, 
1978). It is only from such a range that the diversity of social values 
present in society may be brought to bear on development proposals. But 
more imPortantly, comprehensiveness also implies an understanding of the 
range of mutual influences between development activities and the environment. 
Thus the EIA process requires systematic and adaptive assessment of environ-
mental impacts, taking explicit account of uncertainties (the reliability of 
information) and social values (the criteria of relevance and significance). 
The continuing recognition and feedback of technical and valuational information 
concerning environmental impacts, provides a flexibility of action design both 
within and between EIA iterations. 
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The question of the substantive influence of the EIA process on decision-
making is also difficult to answer in operative terms. Criteria for its 
substantive influence cannot be separated from those for the EIARP as a 
whole. The above normative framework implies a need to develop an enhanced 
awareness and valuation of the environment through successive EIA iterations. 
Thus, substantive influences may come about through strong linkages between 
successive iterations and the executive elements in the EIARP (proponent, 
decision-maker). This also suggests the need for close links with the 
policy-making and planning environment of the process. The political nature 
of this decision-making environment means that conflicting values will 
exist. Their expression through the EIA process by one set of actors requires 
an iterative review process by another set. 
THE REVIEW PROCESS 
The review process is also a fundamental substantive element of the EIARP. 
Successive reviews exist as iterative checks of each EIA process throughout 
the EIARP, and also vary in procedural form and function. The "decision 
on screening", the formal "review of EIA" , the "decision on (monitoring 
and assessment) results", and any "judicial review", are all substantive 
iterations of the review process (Figure 5). 
What ought to be the substantive nature and purpose of the review process in 
the light of the objectives of the EIARP? Its recognized substantive purpose 
is to review the information generated in an EIA process in order to substan-
tively influence the decision-making process. What does it mean to review? 
And what ought to be the nature of its influences? 
The following discussion broadly parallels that of the EIA process. It is 
directed specifically towards the formal "review of EIA" (Figure 5) but applies 
generally to all review processes. As with the EIA process, current 
experience with both technical and normative aspects of the review process 
needs to be understood. 
The formal review of the EIA is designed to check and add to the information 
system developed through the EIA process. In all EIARPs surveyed, there is 
a reviewer who is an administrative agency with environmental management 
responsibilities (either advisory or executive) (Chapter 3.3). The reviewer 
carries out a technical check of the EIA, and the criteria usually applied 
(e.g. completeness, relevance, objectivity (Munn, 1979) refer to the 
technical understanding of environmental impacts, including any technically 
derived weightings of impact significance. EIAs are also reviewed by other 
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central government agencies, and regional and local institutions who have an 
interest in or who are affected by the proposed action and its implications. 
Technical critiques are passed on to the reviewer as documentary input to the 
review. 
The public are involved as review process participants in all operative 
EIARPs surveyed, although to widely varying degrees. The reasons for public 
involvement are borne mainly of political and administrative desire for public 
legitimation of development actions through conflict resolution (e.g. Clark, 
1981) . The implicit objectives of legitimation and conflict resolution are 
ultimately derived from the democratic political basis of the countries in 
which an EIARP operates. Public review is generally considered necessary 
to enable a wide range of social valuations concerning a development proposal 
and the significance of its impacts to be expressed (OECD, 1979). As well, 
it is apprec;iated that public review adds to and checks the technical infor-
mation, besides being "an important factor in resolving differences of view 
between proponent and objectors" (op. cit.). In a broader context, public 
participation in the review process is a substantive element in the policy-
making and planning processes generally (Chapter 2). 
Judicial review of EIA processes is usually extremely limited. The notable 
exception is the U.S. Federal EIARP under NEPA, where there is a well-
established scope for review through the courts, throughout the EIARP. The 
role and effectiveness of litigation as a means of reviewing is discussed 
further in Chapter 3.3, Institutional Framework. 
Substantive and procedural problems with activities carried out prior to the 
review process positively constrain the substantive influence of the review 
process on further decision-making. The substantive nature of the EIA 
process; both time and information available; and the nonnative assumptions 
built into the information by all previous actors; together limit and colour 
the EIA to be reviewed. For example, the substantive deficiencies of no 
statement of action objectives or need; no assessment of alternatives; and 
a narrow scope of EIAi may combine to constrain public, administrative and 
executive understanding of the development proposal. Conflicts over the 
relevance and significance of its implications inevitably arise. This is 
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because the impacts which are perceived as beneficial or adverse, are unequally 
distributed in time and space and among society. Procedural problems with 
timing and organization of public and administrative reviews (e.g. the 
dissemination of information and the receiving of public feed-back), as well 
as the particular institutional framework for the review process, may further 
constrain its substantive influence (Chapter 3.3). Many researchers 
critically comment on such deficien~ies in the u.s. Federal process (e.g. 
'Friesema and Culhane, 1976; Clark, Chapman, Bisset and Wathern, 1978), 
Canadian processes (e.g. Canadian Council of Resources and Environment 
Ministers, 1978; Rees, 1980; 1981; Lucas, 1981), and Australian processes 
(Fowler, 1981). 
A normative model for the review process must include the normative criteria 
developed for the EIA process. The primarily iterative nature of each 
review requires a substantive check of the technical and normative information 
contained in each EIA. This check must enable a substantive adjustment to 
take place in the understanding and valuation by society of the environmental 
consequences of development designs or options. The process must provide a 
more comprehensive range of social valuations held or received, as input to 
further decision-making on the action. The understanding and valuation of 
environmental change in the light of competing social goals is finally 
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manifest through executive decision-making. However, the review process is 
functionally effective if environmental consequences are recognized and 
appreciated in the substantive nature of the decision. Thus, the criteria 
of comprehensiveness, reliability, relevance and significance in an iterative 
context prescribe the substantive nature of the review process. 
However, a normative framework for EIA and review processes may be of limited 
functional effectiveness if unconnected to the larger policy-making and 
planning environment. The discussions which follow examine the policy-
making and planning processes, and their connections with the EIARP, in order 
to develop normative criteria for each relationship. 
THE EIARP AND POLICY 
The following discussion attempts to understand the relationship between 
the EIARP, environmental management policy and the policy-making process. 
This is in order to provide answers to the question: what ought to be the 
nature of the relationship? 
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To begin I return to the model of the policy-making process developed in 
Chapter 2. This model implies that public policy is derived from a de facto 
"consensus of a number of variably linked power centres (as individuals or 
collectives) in society (Etzioni, 1968). Public policy therefore represents 
mor"e" or less legitimated social norms, expressed as implicit or explicit 
intents of political, legal and administrative institutions (Lindblom, 1980). 
The implementation of policy (through development) may vary greatly from 
intent (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979). Nevertheless, policy outcomes reflect 
the application of a set of agreed or imposed substantive values. Conflicting 
social values then create perceptions uf new problems to be addressed by 
policy-making, as a form of social practice (Friedmann, 1978). 
The policy-making process operates within a social and institutional environ-
ment, the structure of which varies considerably among western countries. 
Normative concern for environmental quality as a social goal, has stimulated 
the develoPJIlent of environmental management policy. Analysis of" "environ-
mental policy" centres not on its substantive nature (which is accepted as 
given by most analysts), but on its effectiveness (measures of which are 
disputed) . But, however measured, the effectiveness of public policy 
concerned with environmental management goals depends on three complex 
variables. There are, (i) the way in which public policy is made, 
(ii) the resulting nature of environmental policy, and (iii) the actual 
influences of this policy on other public policies and social values through 
decision-making. The EIARP can be seen as an instrumental means of 
"implementing substantive policy on environmental management. To this extent, 
the effectiveness of an EIARP becomes a proximal demonstration of the 
effectIveness of environmental policy, within a particular socio-political 
context (e.g. Wandesforde-Smith, 1980a). 
The implementation of NEPA, the u.s. Federal statute, is an example of how 
the effectiveness of an EIARP may be influenced by its policy context. For 
the U.S. in the 1960s, NEPA was a significant statement of public policy 
concerning the environment "reflecting a reorientation of priorities to 
accord with changing environmental values and perceptions" (Caldwell, 1976). 
NEPA Was formulated in the context of criticism of administrative fragmen-
tation~-o"f natural resources management, and of the lack of awareness of the 
erivh'onmental implications of public decision-making {Dreyfus and Ingram, 
1976F,- The substantive goals of NEPA's policy directed federal decision-
"ma:ki'ng to broadly pursue environmental quality "... consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy .. " (s.101(b». The procedure 
requiring an EIS (s.102(2) (c» was intended to implement and enforce this 
policy by substantively altering decision-making through the greater 
weighting of environmental quality (Caldwell, 1976). Further, the Council 
on Environmental Quality was established under NEPA to provide an ongoing 
review of the implementation of the policy. 
Comment on the effectiveness of NEPA's implementation through the EIS 
procedure is equivocal. On the one hand, it is considered that the scope 
of operations was expanded during implementation, largely through broad 
judicial reviews of the process (Dreyfus and Ingram, 1976; Cortner, 1976). 
It is thus asserted that federal decision-making has been substantively 
influenced by this EIARP through mandating an increased awareness of 
environmental values (Caldwell, 1976, 1979). Others claim that political 
influences, through public involvement in federal decision-making, have 
been largely responsible for its effectiveness (e.g. Friesema and Culhane, 
1976) . However, it is conceded that this effectiveness is limited by the 
degree of actual integration of the formal procedure with decision-making 
(op. cit.). 
On the other hand, it is questioned whether mandating more "open, informed 
and integrated" decision-making has in practice resulted in "better" 
decisions (Fairfax, 1978; Fairfax and Ingram, 1981). These analysts 
claim that institutionalization of the EIS process has resulted in the 
elevation of procedure over substance, and that various political influences 
have shaped actual administrative behaviour much more closely. 
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However, effectiveness is relative to the normative perceptions of the actors 
in a political process, including those of commentators (Wandesforde-Smith, 
1980a~ 1981; Chapter 1). Wandesforde-Smith notes the variety of social 
and institutional influences in practice on environmental policy implementation. 
These include the power of interest groups through the judicial process, as 
well as through informal methods of conflict resolution (e.g. Susskind, 1980). 
Further influences are the multitude of interagency, political and economic 
interests surrounding each development planning process. Thus, effectiveness 
may be viewed differently by different actors. Wandesforde-Smith (1980a) 
considers that effectiveness therefore can only be seen through the way policy 
implementation has caused a reformulation of its meaning, following sub-
stantive outcomes. He summarizes NEPA as "the basis for a social learning 
process with respect to environmental policy". His implication is that 
flexibility of policy design extends to environmental policy. Problem 
definitions forming the basis of environmental management will inevitably 
change. Rigid design makes implementation ineffective, through changing 
social and institutional conditions. NEPA's rigid procedural design 
(through legal enforcement) contrasts with its broadly explicit, although 
poorly connected substantive basis. This mismatch is criticized for 
limiting the effectiveness of the process (e.g. Fairfax, 1978). However, 
the NEPA Regulations (USCEQ, 1978) appear to have increased procedural 
flexibility (Fairfax and Ingram, 1981; Chapter 3.3 Scoping and EIA). 
In contrast to the policy basis of NEPA, the Canadian federal EIARP is an 
example of one with an implicit and informal policy basis, whose intent 
has been widely ignored. The FEARP is an administrative procedure, in 
operation since 1973, which simply requires federal agencies to take into 
account the environmental implications of public development planning and 
implementation (FEARO, 1979). Recent critical reviews have highlighted its 
discretionary nature and tenuous links with public policy-making (Canadian 
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Environmental Advisory Council, 1979; Rees, 1980; 1981; Lucas, 1981). These 
studies outline many procedural design adjustments considered necessary. 
But, as Rees (1980) conunents: "All the tinkering with administrative and 
procedural requirements does nothing to move environmental assessment closer 
to being an integral part of project planning." Rees considers the most 
significant substantive deficiency of FEARP to be the general lack of an 
explicit national environmental policy; and the related lack of integration 
of public development policies and policy-making with FEARP's meagre policy 
basis. Furthermore, bacause of generally fragmented federal development 
policy, "Environmental reviews are conducted in a policy vacuum" so that the 
FEARP "in effect has become a de facto policy generator and catalyst ... ". 
Analyses of Canadian public policy-making and several recent case examples 
of developments are cited in support of this. 
The above examples are brief illustrations of the variable relationships 
between policy-making, environmental management policy and the EIARP. They 
indicate that the existence of environmental management policy, while required 
to locate the EIARP in the decision-making process, does not necessarily lead 
to "sound" decisions. Implementation through the EIARP involves the social 
and institutional environment of the policy and its instrument. The 
complexities and uncertainties in the implementation of public policies 
have clear implications for their design (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979). 
Substantive environmental policy and the EIARP as a procedural instrument 
can never be completely specified. Literal implementation is literally 
impossible (op. cit.); Wandesforde-Smith, 1981). These authors recognize 
the essentially iterative nature of policy design and implementation. Their 
conclusions' are in accord with the model of decision-making developed in 
Chapter 2 and are supported by other empirical studies of policy-making 
(e.g. citations in Miller, Anderson and Liroff, 1976). 
A normative framework for environmental management policy requires the 
integration of substantive goals and procedural objectives. An explicit 
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policy is needed, however it should be sufficiently flexible to allow its 
operative meaning to be capable of change without negating fundamental intent. 
The mutual dependency of substance and procedure requires an EIARP that is 
similarly flexible. 
Most importantly, the integration of the EIARP with public policy-making 
is required. Q'Riordan and Sewell (1981) advance a model for explaining 
the effectiveness of the EIARP in development policy-making. They suggest 
that certain variables of the "national political culture" significantly 
influence this integration. These variables include the democratic style 
(degree of plurality present), political accountability ("openness" of 
decision-making) and interest group influence. However, integration can 
only take place if the political and administrative framework for development 
policy-making can accept the legitimacy of environmental policy as a social 
goal. For example, economic values currently implicit in this framework 
may successfully compete with environmental values because the latter are 
deemed less "legitimate". Legitimacy ultimately arises through political 
processes, and the variables listed above may well be significant in the 
legitimation of environmental management policY, regardless of its basis. 
Thus,. legitimation, integration and adaptiveness prescribe the policy context 
of the EIARP. 
THE EIARP AND PLANNING 
Planning has been generally defined as a social process lin~ing knowledge 
and organized action (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974; Chapter 2). The EIARP 
may therefore be seen as an element of a larger planning process. A broad 
scope of interest, and an iterative nature are substantive elements common 
to the EIARP and planning generally; both constitute social learning 
processes in an abstract sense (op. cit.). Chapter 2 presents a model of 
the decision-making process as social learning and as a framework for both 
the EIARP and the planning process. 
In slightly more operative terms, the atemporal iterative elements COlrumon to 
the EIARP and the planning process include: 
(i) articulation of the intent and design of certain actions; 
(ii) development of technical and social knowledge about the action and 
its implications; and 
(iii) adjustment of the action intent and design in the light of this 
knowledge. 
This model is coloured by societal perceptions about the nature of action 
as development, and also by normative explanations of the planning process 
(i.e. what planning ought to be, and the way it ought to be carried out). 
For example, development may be perceived as physical resource use through 
technology, or in intangible, qualitative terms. Explanations of planning 
include the rationalist model, the organization development model, and the 
various "synthetic" models (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974). 
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These two influences surface firstly in the way formalized planning processes 
characterize development; e.g. "develoment planning" or "development control" 
procedures. Secondly, they show in the kinds of planning methodologies used. 
For example, the common design of EIA as a rational planning method is reflected 
in the generally unqualified call for comprehensive and objective analysis 
of means (the project) given ends (its need). Thus, all means (as options) 
and all implications of those means (as impacts) are to be rigorously examined 
in the EIA (by whomever), with no prior commitment being shown toward any 
particular option. Further, "normative problems" (social conflicts) are 
dealt with by the use of sophisticated value-weightings. These are 
objectively derived, quantified and mathematically manipulated in the expectation 
that they will be reflected in the decision-maker's outlook at the time of 
decision. What this conception ignores however, is the dynamic social reality 
of development planning. The constraints of time and money, and the various 
political interests and influences may combine to reduce such a procedure 
to an irrelevant farce. 
Planning as a state function is present in the institutional framework of 
most western democracies. Public laws embody policies encouraging regulated 
social change, and specify a range of planning procedures. Planning 
practices which follow are mostly concerned with the functional organization 
of 'social (and economic) activities through space and time, according to 
national, regional or local development policies. Such practices are 
commonly collectively termed "land-use planning" (e.g. Lichfield and 
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Marinov, 1977) and include spatially organized practices (e.g. urban and 
regio'nal planning) as well as resource-specific practices (e. g. water, energy, 
and wilderness planning). The formulation of goals and objectives; assess-
ment and documentation of strategies; and public and institutional involvement 
in the iterative review of strategies; are common elements of land-use 
planning practices and the EIARP (Lee and Wood, 1978). 
It is not surprising that many have argued the importance of integrating the 
EIARP with other planning processes. It is considered that established 
planning practices show substantive and procedural deficiencies in terms of 
the normative basis of the EIARP. As well, the EIARP is seen to be limited 
in its effectiveness without clear linkages with such practices. 
The substantive scope of land-use planning may be as broad as that of the 
EIARP,through the articulation of broad societal goals, and through the 
Qperative use of concepts such as "amenity". However, planning goals may give 
only implicit and vague references to the environment and to environmental 
management goals (Lichfield and Marinov, 1977; Lee and Wood, 1978). Thus, 
specific development actions are often seen 'in even less of a management 
focus than within an EIARP. Furthermore, while the goals and objectives 
of planning practices may be collectively broad, individually they are often 
narrowly functional, and substantive connections may be weak between processes. 
This is reflected in the parallel process of policy-making, where development 
policies take on a momentum in a fragmented and competitive institutional 
environment (Lindblom, 1980). 
The assessment and review of development proposals is considered to be 
"fundamental to the concept of planning" (OECD, 1979). Whether or not these 
activities are structured within an EIARP, they always take place within a 
broader policy-making and planning context. The usual practice of using 
a project-only EIARP is often criticized for an ad hoc, reactive application 
to actions, without clear reference to these decision-making perspectives 
(OPe cit.). Equally importantly, it is realized that the EIARP cannot 
operate effectively without the existence of integrated planning objectives 
and policies (Pearlman, 1977; Wandesforde-Smith, 1977; Hollick, 1981a). 
Procedural problems with land-use planning have established a strong ca~e 
for the integration of the EIARP with planning processes. Land-use plans 
are generally well-structured and spatially organized, developed from a 
broadly based information system. Procedural tools used include zoning, 
state acquisition of land for public purposes, and legal planning consents 
or permits. However, 'spatial organization through zoning is influenced 
by the historical context of resource use. An often rigid development 
framework results through the inertia of such procedures. Thus, conflicting 
and socially and ecologically damaging uses may persist, without their 
adverse impacts being appreciated or mitigated. Further, because of this 
rigidity, assessment procedures for land-based development ,projects are 
generally not as systematized as they are under the EIARP. Alternatives 
and impacts may not be explicitly assessed (Lichfield and Marino~, 1977), 
and the procedure may not allow for assessment at an early stage of action 
design (Catlow and Thirlwall, 1976). The recognition or appreciation of 
significant impacts may only occur when planning consent is formally applied 
for. This increases the risk of conflicts remaining unreconciled, with 
uncertain legitimation of proposed actions (Bosward and Staveley, 1981). 
It is therefore rrotsurprising that existing land-use planning processes are 
criticized for delays in the approval of major projects. However, the 
integration of a formalized assessment process is often perceived as an 
added burden. The claim that the use of an EIARP adds significant delays 
and costs to development planning procedures is considered a false argument, 
following analyses of case histories (e.g. USCEQ, 1976; US EPA , 1980; 
Commission of the European Communities, 1980). Delays and costs are usually 
, attributed to procedural rigidities and inefficiencies built into existing 
processes (Cat1ow and Thir1wal1, 1976). It is increasingly recognized 
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that the use of an EI'ARP can improve the effectiveness of planning processes, 
especially for major development projects {Lichfie1d and Marinov, 1977; 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1980; Wandesforde-Smith, 1980b). 
The systematic incorporation of an EIARP with formal land-use planning 
procedures is present in the New South Wales Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act, 1979. Prior to this integration, numerous deficiencies 
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and duplications of effort were recognized in the separate coexistence of 
each process (Boward and Staveley, 1981). Under the new process, local 
regional and state plans and policies develop an integrated framework at 
varying spatial levels. Specific development actions are then screened 
and assessed by the proponent, and reviewed by the planning authority and 
the public. The Department of Planning and Environment exercises both 
regional and state planning responsibilities, as well as an overview function 
of the EIARP. No critical analysis of the operations of this integratc~ 
process yet exists (Fowler, 1981). 
The proposed EEC Dire.ctive for EIA is a further attempt to integrate the 
EIARP with established planning processes: 
" ••. The assessment of projects is not seen as an 
alternative to assessment of land use plans or 
.other activities but rather as a complement, 
each of them performing different tasks" 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1980). 
The integration of the EIARP with other formalized planning processes has 
important implications for the design of both processes. The scope and 
criteria for operation must be explicitly related to the scope of other 
planning processes. This argues for a broad scope, to include urban and 
regional, social and economic systems as well as physical and ecological 
systems (Lichfield and Marinov, 1977). The exclusion of generic actions 
must presume the ability of other planning processes to assess these actions. 
Flexibility is required in deciding what types of actions are to be 
assessed by the EIARP. Procedural questions demand consideration of the 
institutional framework for planning and its integration with that of the 
EIARP. 
A normative framework for the relationship between the EIARP and the planning 
process begins with the recognition and appreciation of substantive and 
procedural linkages, and of the increased effectiveness of the EIARP through 
their strengthening. Further, the reciprocal influences of policy-making 
and planning are important considerations. Their integration is a 
necessary,prerequisite for an effective EIARP, which cannot be relied on to 
be the primary mechanism for this integration (Pearlman, 1977; Wandesford-
Smith, 1977). Substantive integration of all three processes depends greatly 
on the nature of the institutional framework for environmental management 
(Chapter 3.3). 
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3.3 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
SCREENING 
The screening procedure constitutes the first substantive iteration of the 
EIARP (Figure 5). Screening is the initial assessment of a conceptualized 
action, to determine whether further assessment is needed. It is an 
operative test of the state of information concerning an action and its 
environmental implications. Screening is bounded by two decision points; 
the "decision to screen", and, following an initial assessment, a review 
"decision on screening" (Figure 5). This latter decision may determine 
whether an iteration of the initial assessment, a fuller EIA, or no further 
assessment, is needed. 
~fuen ought actions to be screened? Who should screen and review screening 
results? And how should screening be carried out? Most EIARPs are 
intended to operate as early as possible in the action planning process. This 
follows the observation that the initial design of an action, once set, 
substantially determines the range and significance of environmental impacts 
generated, regardless of mitigative modifications. For example, the u.S. 
federal EIARP is required to be integrated with action planning: 
" ... at the earliest possible time to insure 
(sic) that planning and decisions reflect 
environmental values, to avoid delays later 
in the process and to head off potential 
conflicts" 
(USCEQ, 1978 s.1501.2) 
However, in consideration of the immense variety of possible actions applicable 
to the EIARP, there can be no single moment during action design when an 
EIARP might apply definitively. Generic level actions (e.g. policies, 
programmes) are a particular problem. Whilst there is a strong normative 
requirement to assess such actions (Chapter 3.2, Scope of Application), policy 
formulation does not necessarily crystallize at a single point in time. 
Further, the generality of information implied by a policy may limit the value 
of an assessment (Miller, Anderson and Liroff, 1976). Holling et ale (1978) 
argue convincingly for beginning assessment at the outset of the design 
process for development policy. However, their recommendations relate to 
the design of specific resource management policy, and are based on the use 
of ecosystem simulation modelling. Such an assessment method has yet to 
be applied to comprehensive development policies (Bisset, 1980a). 
The timing of application of the EIARP through initial screening is a 
judgemental decision. It relates to the state of available information 
on the action, the perceived potential impacts, and the extent of executive 
commitment to the action design (Miller, Anderson and Liroff, 1976). 
The criteria for operation guide the more or less discretionary decision 
to screen. The screening activity is intended to generate information on 
the action as a basis for further decision-making. Screening activities 
and decisions are usually carried out by the proponent or initiating agency 
in the u.S. Federal process, the Canadian processes (e.g. Lucas, 1981) and 
Australian processes (e.g. Fowler, 1981). Formalized procedures and 
criteria for screening are variably specified. An analysis of possible 
decisions following screening is as follows (after FEARO, 1978): 
(i) sufficient information on action; no significant (adverse) impacts; 
no further action under EIARP. 
(ii) sufficient information; significant (adverse) impacts, further 
assessment needed (scope and carry out formal EIA). 
(iii) insufficient information, potentially significant (adverse) impacts; 
further assessment needed (iterate initial assessment) . 
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Where no further action is carried out (under (i) above), other institutional 
processes usually apply to regulate the implementation of an action. 
Documentation of the screening procedure is highly variable. In the 
Canadian Federal EIARP (FEARP) there is virtually no documentation of type 
(i) screening decisions either made or available (Rees, 1980). Rees 
questions the rigour and consistency of internal review decisions, which he 
considers·are "entirely ad hoc, undocumented and impossible to evaluate". 
There is general uncertainty concerning who carries out screening in 
Canadian processes (Lucas, 1981), and Fowler, (1981) reports a similar 
situation in Australia. In all these processes, the potential for judicial 
review of screening is extremely limited, mainly because of the administrative 
(informal) nature of the EIARPs (op. cit.). 
There is variable external review of the initial assessment. Most Canadian 
and Australian processes allow for a discretionary, internal review decision 
to be made for both public and private actions, by the initiating agency 
Or the private proponent. In a few, the overview agency or the formal 
reviewer may decide (e.g. in New South Wales) i in others it is a political 
decision (e.g. in Alberta). In all the above processes, public involvement 
in screening is non-existent. In the U.S., there is public involvement in 
the initial assessment, which is published together with the screening 
decision. This, and the possibility of judicial review, has resulted in 
an unusually open screening procedure. 
In a few processes, the discretionary nature of screening has been largely 
removed by a prescriptive listing of certain types of actions which require 
initial and/or continuing assessment (Chapter 3.2, Criteria for Operation). 
Rees (1980, 1981); Lucas (198U and Fowler (1981) all argue for a more 
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systematic and open approach to screening. They consider that a discretionary 
procedure may increase flexibility but also increases uncertainties, and, by 
implication, the undue maintenance of power by those with discretions to 
exercise. 
A normative procedural framework for screening is impossible to specify in 
other than general terms. The scope and criteria for operation should be 
made explicit and precise so that a proponent may determine the earliest 
feasible time for screening and further assessment of proposals. Screening 
for environmental implications should be undertaken at the beginning of any 
technical and economic feasibility studies (e.g. Catlow and Thirlwall, 1976). 
The criteria of state of information, perceived potential impacts and 
extent of commitment to a design option may be the best that can be used for 
specifying when to screen (Miller, Anderson and Liroff, 1976). The extent 
of commitment implies the degree to which design options have been fore-
closed by prior decision-making. Screening ought to take place as options 
are being conceptualized. This applies especially to generic level action 
design (op. cit.). To this extent, the integration of screening as the 
first procedural activity of the EIARP, with policy-making and planning 
processes is required. 
The procedure and criteria for use in screening ought also to be explicit. The 
screening authority should be identified, and the authorities and decisions be made 
subject to external institutional and public review for "significant" 
proposals. Both technical and normative decisions are involved in the 
determination of "significant impacts" during screening. This determination 
by wider review is as important at the b~ginning of the EIARP as in later 
iterations (Lee, 1982). Thus while there is obvious practical merit in 
proponent screening, the built-in bias must be recognized in designing the 
screening procedure. A clearly specified and open procedure (but within 
the bounds of commercial confidentiality) should improve the effectiveness 
of screening for both technical and political reasons (e.g. through 
enhanced public confidence in public policy-making and planning) . 
SCOPING AND EIA 
47. 
The procedures of scoping and EIA together constitute the second assessment 
iteration of the EIARP . (Figure 5). These activities are intended to generate 
a fuller information system on the alternatives and environmental impacts 
of a proposed action. The extent to which this information system is 
developed and used in decision-making is a measure of its functional 
effectiveness. Normative substantive requirements necessarily shape the 
procedures (Chapter 3.2, The EIA Process). Questions concerning when and 
how scoping and EIA ought to be carried out, and by whom, can never be 
answered specifically. The relationship of these procedures to screening 
provides a partial answer (for example, on timing) . However, the substan-
tive importance of scoping and EIA as the major pre-implementation EIA 
process requires consideration of such procedural questions. 
Scoping is a formalized or de facto activity in which the relevant actors 
define and select the range or scope of action designs and environmental 
impacts to be assessed in the EIA. The recognized intent is to make the 
EIA a more manageable and effective information tool by determining and 
analyzing the "relevant" and "significant" issues (e.g. USCEQ, 1978; 
FEARO, 1979). As Bacow (1980) notes, this is an inherently subjective 
procedure, in which the positive constraints of time and availability of 
information force decisions on scope that become normative considerations. 
To this extent, scoping is a crucial activity. Once there is an investment 
of time, money and effort in the chosen scope of the EIA, opportunities 
for learning about further options and impacts may be effectively foreclosed. 
What remains unknown may then be ignored, with possibly unexpected consequences 
following implementation (Chapter 1). 
While procedurally separated, scoping as a substantive process actually takes 
place throughout the EIA process, as effort is progressively focussed on 
certain alternatives and impacts. This reflects the situation that some 
information must be generated before "significant" issues can be identified 
and evaluated (Bacow, 1980). The normative procedural requirements for 
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scoping thus parallel those for EIA (see below). 
As with screening, scoping and EIA are intended to be carried out as early 
as possible in the development planning process. Experience has shown that 
there are inherent organizational limits to the timing of EIA, in that 
information and prior decision-making effectively constrain the value of 
early assessment (see discussion on screening) • As with screening, the 
integration of scoping and EIA activities with policy-making and planning 
processes are ultimate constraints. 
Most EIAs are scoped and carried out by the proponent, with variable 
administrative (interagency, reviewer) and public input. This inbuilt 
organizational bias (Friesema and Culhane, 1976) is usually defended on 
several grounds. Firstly, as the proponent is always a central decision-
making actor (especially when a public agency), internally generated 
adaptiveness in substantive decision-making is preferable to externally 
imposed decisions. In the latter situation, questions of conflict 
resolution and legitimation may arise, through the simple observation that an 
"independent" assessment may be no less partial. 
Secondly, the proponent is primarily in control of the generation of infor-
mation concerning action designs. There may be a clear economic incentive 
for the proponent to reduce internalized costs, by mitigating adverse 
impacts through adaptive design. However, this argument presumes that there 
is, in fact, a range of social and institutional sanctions to influence 
the internalization of costs. These may include the risk of delay of 
implementation through public and political criticism of the action, 
mandatory assessment and review criteria, and other environmental policy 
instruments (e.g. charges, standards, taxes and subsidies) . 
In practice, proponent bias in the EIA activity is constrained by the 
influences of other actors in scoping the EIA, and by the criteria used for 
the scope of the EIA. Usually, specialist advisors from the reviewer 
organization and other government agencies provide technical information 
on a consultative basis. Public involvement in scoping and EIA is 
variable. In Canadian EIARPs it is generally limited; Rees (1980) and 
Lucas (1981) conclude that this is because of vague and informal requirements. 
Administrative control of scoping and EIA by the reviewer &ppears to be a 
factor in increased involvement (op. cit.). In Australian processes,there 
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is virtually no public involvement until the review; Fowler (1981) similarly 
concludes that this is because of discretionary procedures. 
In contrast, the U.S. federal procedures require public advertisement of 
a "Notice of Intent" by the proponent agency to begin scoping. Government 
agency and public consultation takes place, and a "determined" scope of 
the EIA is then followed, subject to revision with "significant new ... 
information" arising (USCEQ, 1978). 
However, what is "relevant" or "significant" reflects the judgements of the 
proponent/assessor, unless formally or informally influenced by the admin-
istrative reviewer or the public (Chapter 3.2, The EIA Process). 
EIAs are almost always documented and published. Most EIARPs specify or 
prescribe the substantive contents of the documented EIA. The historic 
NEPA provision (s .102 (2) (c» provided a model for many processes, however there 
is significant variation in what is specified and provided. In practice, 
some or all of the following are required: 
(i) statement of action objectives or need 
(ii) description of proposed action and alternatives 
(iii) analysis of existing and impacted environment 
(iv) assessment of significant impacts 
(v) description of mitigation measures 
(vi) description of monitoring programme. 
Items (iii), (iv) , (v) and (vi) may be variably applied to the alternatives 
described, as well as to the proposed action. 
Technical methods for carrying out an EIA (methodologies) are varied and 
there is a substantial body of international literature dealing with EIA 
as a technical process (e.g. Clark, Bisset and Wathern, 1980). Technical 
experience has developed a range of methodologies, each of which appear to 
be particularly suited to certain tasks in EIA (Bisset, 1980a; Lee, 1982). 
These technically defined tasks are as follows: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
impact identification 
prediction and measurement 
interpretation or evaluation of significance 
communication (including amalgamation or aggregation 
of above). 
In the EIARPs surveyed, there were no formalized requirements for using 
certain EIA methodologies, reflecting the youthful and dynamic nature of 
this technical field. 
The bulk of critical research into the substantive nature of ElAs actually 
produced, has been carried out in the United States. Documented length, 
comprehensibility and relevance of information were the main criticisms 
in an early survey (USCEQ, 1976). Particular criticisms included a 
restricted scope of analysis, often to a degree unrelated to the perceived 
significance of impacts; and little indication of the need of the proposed 
acti(,m or of "reasonable alternatives" (op. cit.). 
The NEPA Regulations (USCEQ, 1978) have apparently led to substantive 
improvements in the EIA as an information system and as an element in the 
decision-making process (USCEQ, 1980; USEPA, 1980). Specific procedural 
changes of substantive importance include: 
(i) formalizing of the scoping procedure to concentrate on 
"significant" issues; 
(ii) provision for tiering of ElAs (structuring of the substantive 
content of EIAs of related generic and specific actions); 
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(iii) a more rigorous requirement to analyze alternatives to the 
proposed action (including the no-action alternative, and the 
specification of the "environmentally preferable alternative(s)") i 
(iv) requirement for a "Record of Decision" as a public record of the 
the alternative actions analyzed, the decision made, its policy 
implications, and the mitigation measures and monitoring 
programme instituted; and 
(v) a requirement for closer integration of the NEPA procedures with 
other institutional requirements for environmental assessment 
and management. 
These procedural reforms appear to have been made because it was realized 
that sheer quantity of information is a poor indicator of substantive 
influence. Further, qualitative attributes (e.g. reliability, relevance, 
significance) need greater policy orientation through "providing a clear 
basis for choice among options by the decision-maker and the public" 
(USCEQ, 1978). O'Hare (1980) supports the need for policy orientation in 
his recommending that information be "packaged" primarily for the user, 
not the subject. 
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It is difficult to judge to what extent the above experiences are simply 
formalized responses to the particular decision-making process ("national 
political culture") of the united states. The power of the u.s. judicial 
process has evidently contributed to greater clarification and detailing of 
formal requirements. Other EIARPs appear to function less formally in the 
EIA activity. However, documentation does indicate substantive problems 
through procedural vagueness and discretion (e.g. Lucas, 1981; Fowler, 1981; 
Clark, Bisset and Wathern, 1981). 
Procedural norms are therefore impossible to prescribe in any specific way. 
However, the EIA procedure must be seen as a socially and technically 
derived information system, and as a vehicle for substantively influencing 
decision-making. Obviously, its generation must precede executive 
decisions on implementation, and, as with screening, take place "as options 
are being conceptualized, so that alternatives are assessed" (USCEQ, 1978). 
Integration with concurrent policy-making and planning activities is also 
required. 
Whether or not the EIA is undertaken by the proponent, available resources 
(time, money, effort, existing information) require consideration and 
adaptive use. The openness of scoping and EIA engenders a comprehensive 
approach, and conflict resolution on questions of relevance and significance. 
There are implications here for interagency and public involvement. 
As an information system, the EIA must include all the substantive elements 
specified earlier (action objectives; alternatives; impact assessment, 
mitigation and monitoring) . The substantive criteria of comprehensiveness 
and adaptiveness, together with consideration of reliability, relevance and 
significance, apply to the generation of information in EIA. Finally, 
policy-orientation perhaps summarizes requirements for communication of this 
information. 
REVIEWING 
All operative EIARPs have a formalized review procedure following the 
completion and docwnentation of the EIA (Figure 5). The actors collectively 
involved in reviewing check the information in the EIA, and add to it. 
The formal reviewer receives and uses review corrunents in an iterative 
assessment of the proposed action, alternatives and environmental impacts. 
A review document usually results; and the reviewer may decide on the 
technical adequacy of the EIA, and may make recommendations concerning the 
proposed action. Depending upon the structural flexibility of the EIARP, 
and on the stage of action planning, more than one EIA may be carried out 
and reviewed prior to executive decision-making on the proposal. 
Procedural questions of timing, the actors involved, and how the review 
is carried out all have substantive implications. In all operative EIARPs 
surveyed there is both administrative and public review of the EIA and 
action prior to executive decision-making. There is also a highly 
variable scope for judicial review at this stage. s~ecified time limits 
usually apply to the preparation of the EIA documentation (usually called 
an EIS or EIR (environmental impact report)) and its circulation for 
review commenting. 
As with prior activities in the EIARP, reviewing is intended to take place 
as early as possible in action planning, and always prior to executive 
decision-making. However, weak linkages between the EIARP and policy-
making and planning processes may limit this timing to late stages, with 
the inevitable unresolved conflicts. There are of course, organizational 
limits to early timing; in practice, reviewing is wholly dependent on when 
previous activities take place. 
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The public review is an overtly political aspect of reviewing, as in practice 
it is at this stage that the full nature and implications of action design 
become known. Mlile a public review of the proposal is universal, there 
is considerable variation in the degree of actual public involvement. Time 
limits for public review may be rigid and too short for effective reviewing, 
especially if there has been no prior public participation in the EIARP 
(e.g. in screening or scoping) . Arguments for early public involvement 
emphasize that some general information is more useful than none at an early 
design stage. Further, early information on later opportunities for public 
involvement stimulates awareness and confidence (e.g. Canadian Council of 
Resource and Environment Ministers, 1978). 
Rees (1980) considers that there is a lack of rigour and consistency in public 
and administrative reviews in the Canadian FEARP. He attributes this to 
a vague, discretionary procedure which in practice allows the proponent/ 
assessor and administrative reviewers undue influence over reviewing. 
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Objectivity and independence in the formal reviewer is generally presumed, 
but subjective influences are inevitable (Rees, 1980). Limited 
opportunities for judicial review are also cited by Lucas (1981) and Fowler 
(1981) as procedural deficiencies, in the largely informal and discretionary 
Canadian and Australian review procedures. 
In the U.S. under NEPA, proponent agencies are primarily responsible for 
reviewing their own EIA and often for making an executive decision on an 
action. This structural bias is considered to be effectively countered by 
an explicit, open procedure for public, administrative and judicial review 
(Friesema and Culhane, 1976). In addition the NEPA procedure formally 
requires two iterations of the EIA and review activities (USCEQ, 1978). 
A draft EIS is circulated and public and interagency reviews take place 
(including reviews by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. 
Council on Environmental Quality, both of whom have formal overview 
functions). The final EIS is required to take account of all review 
comments, and is also circulated before executive decision-making (op. cit.). 
Reviews may take place in a number of ways; for example, consultation, 
meetings and documentation. Problems with funding the review - the 
publication of the EIA, conducting public hearings, and publishing the 
review document - reflect the political question of responsibility for 
information ·transfer. In most procedures, the costs of preparing and 
publishing the ElA are borne by the proponent, whether public or private. 
Publication of the review document is always a public cost. Funding of 
interest groups to more fully participate in reviewing is a further issue 
of political and substantive importance (Rees, 1980; Clark, 1981). 
The review procedure must allow for an iterative check of a proposed action 
following the ElA (Chapter 3.2, The Review Process). Hence the scope of 
review depends on that of the EIA but must be specified as broadly as the 
normative scope of that activity (Lucas, 1981). The procedural review of 
the ElA, must allow a substantive review of the proposed action (Fowler, 
1981). Fairfax (1978) points out the risk of emphasizing procedure over 
substance of reviewing through a rigid structural design. Timing depends 
on that of prior activities, but the requirement must be for early rather 
than late reviewing in relation to decision-making on action design. 
A robust iteration and a comprehensive approach demand a wide range of 
review actors, in accordance with perceptions of the significance of the 
action and its implications. This requires an explicit but flexible 
procedure. Independence of review actors from the proponent/assessor and 
the executive authority is also necessary. If this does not happen, 
questions arise concerning the resolution of conflict and the legitimacy of 
decision-making. An opportunity for judicial review may be necessary if 
there is no provision for an independent administrative review. The role 
of the reviewer must be clear in relation to that of other actors. Lucas 
(1981) and Fowler (1981) argue that the reviewer's review criteria must be 
made explicit, and that criteria regarding the decision on the technical 
adequacy of the EIA must be distinct from those regarding the normative 
decision on the proposed ac.tion. This should apply whether the reviewer 
is deciding in an advisory or an executive capacity. 
No operative criteria can be set regarding the final executive decision on 
action implementation. This is an inherently political and discretionary 
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decision; and no EIARP has been or can be structured to require every 
substantive decision to accord with environmental management goals. The 
normative complexity of such a requirement is obvious (Chapter 2). However, 
the scope of judicial review of the executive decision is broadened through 
clearly structured EIA and review procedures, whether legally formal or not. 
However, the limitations of judicial review are more obvious in informal 
(administrative) EIARPs (e.g. Lucas, 1981; Fowler, 1981). Further, the 
institutional framework for environmental management may require legal 
consents or permits for action implementation. The relationship of the 
EIARP to the other elements of this framework may further broaden the scope 
of judicial review. 
MONITORING 
Monitoring is the technical process of generating information about environ-
mental change, through systematic collection and analysis of data. The 
monitoring and assessment of environmental impacts generated by a development 
action is poorly developed in most EIARPs. When carried out, monitoring 
and assessment provide information for deciding whether adjustment of the 
action or continued monitoring is needed. These activities constitute 
the fourth (post-implementation) substantive iteration of the EIARP (Figure 5). 
In practice, a monitoring programme may be undertaken to check that 
mitigation measures designed in the EIA and review activities, and required 
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as conditions of action approval, are actually implemented. However, it 
1S significant how few formalized EIARPs have a clearly structured procedure. 
In Canadian processes, a requirement for monitoring and enforcement is 
either not recognized or else is vague (Lucas, 1981). Only two of the six 
Australian EIARPs have some defined procedure (Fowler, 1981). The Common-
wealth (Federal) process is vague and discretionary, and the Western 
Australian process lacks specific scope for enforcement in the light of 
significantly adverse impacts (op.cit.); Hollick, 1981b). 
Since 1979 the NEPA Regulations (USCEQ, 1978) have formally required the 
adoption of a monitoring and enforcement programme so that the R.O.D. 
(Record of Decision) for the development action can state whether: "all 
practical means of mitigation or preventing environmental harm have been 
adopted, and if not, why not". (USCEQ, 1978 s.1505.2). The results of 
"relevant" monitoring are required to be made available to the public upon 
request (op.cit.). Bisset (1980b) notes that the U.S. federal monitoring 
requirement relates only to those mitigation measures specified, and not to 
general checking of the accuracy of impact predictions. In Europe, the 
recently proposed Directive for EIA in. the EEC (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1980) includes a similar requirement relating to mitigation 
measures, with no clear intention of a more comprehensive programme (Bisset, 
1980b) • 
As with all activities in the EIARP, the key problem monitoring must cope 
with is uncertainty (Holling, 1978). The nature of environmental systems 
and the constraints of time and information mean that predictions of impacts 
are uncertain. Predictions may not be realized following implementation, 
and unexpected impacts may occur, often through implementation changes for 
technical or economic reasons. The question of what to monitor is usually 
answered by focussing on the predicted impacts which can be mitigated, and 
for which mitigation measures have been designed (Bisset, 1980b). 
However, monitoring takes time, money and effort. Relevant data on the 
environment of an action may not be available before implementation. The 
choice of variables as indicators of environmental state changes is critical. 
The complexity and lack of understanding of environmental systems makes this 
choice often highly uncertain (op.cit.). As not everything can be measured 
or observed, impact indicators are selected on the basis of knowledge of 
the systems to be disturbed and of the predictions of resulting impacts. 
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Uncerta:inties create a risk of choosing irrelevant or misleading indicators, 
and therefore of an equally irrelevant monitoring programme. These problems 
become acute when impacts are not tangible or measured, or else 
cumulative over long time periods (e.g. heavy metal bioaccumulation) . 
Nowhere can the normative advantages of an iterative, adaptive approach in 
the EIARP be seen more clearly than in monitoring. The post-implementation 
iteration of monitoring, assessment and review must be strongly linked to 
prior iterations, as it is only following action implementation that the 
functional effectiveness of the EIARP may be examined and improved upon. 
The importance of monitoring follows from the recognition of technical and 
social uncertainties in action design and implementation (Holling, 1978; 
Bisset, 1980b). Iterative assessment must follow action implementation, to 
allow for corrective adjusbnents in the action1s operation through knowledge 
of induced environmental change (op. cit.). Iterations are needed to confirm 
the accuracy of impact predictions, to check the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures, and to take account of unexpected impacts. 
The procedural design of a monitoring programme is important, as positive 
constraints may limit its substantive value. In deciding what to monitor, 
adverse impacts capable of mitigation should be discriminated from those 
which are not (Bankes and Thompson, 1980). Monitoring should begin as soon 
as possible in the action planning process, i.e. before implementation or 
immediately following approval. Technical adequacy of monitoring (and also 
of impact prediction) depends on a reliable time series of baseline data, 
coupled with an understanding of the environmental systems disturbed by the 
action. 
The assessment criteria of monitoring results must be explicit, and relate 
to those used in impact evaluation and in action approval (Bankes and Thompson, 
1980). As with pre-implementation iterations, the assessment of monitoring 
results should be open to public and administrative review (op.cit.). In 
practice, useful information can be supplied by affected members of the public. 
Therefore, review decisions should be made independently from the assessment 
of data. 
At this point, clear linkages with the institutional framework for environ-
mental management are vital, especially executive links with the relevant 
administrative institution. For example, the monitoring programme may be a 
requirement of the legal consent or permit for the action. The action may 
also be required to be adjusted in the light of decisions on monitoring 
results. 
Monitoring is also needed to improve predictive techniques for future EIAs. 
To this extent, "post-auditing" of EIAs can be carried out through 
monitoring, and a feedback of post-auditing results set up to organizations 
responsible for EIA activities (Bisset, 1980b). 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
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"Instit;utional framework" (or institutional arrangements), generally describes 
the system of related organizational entities and rules, existing for some 
specified purpose (e.g. FOx, 1976). The institutional framework of a 
society provides a structure for the decision-making process. The 
institutional framework for the EIARP is derived from this structure, and is 
part of the institutional framework for environmental management. The 
great complexity and variation in this framework makes a simplified 
explanation very difficult to develop. 
The framework for decision-making developed in Chapter 2 is however a 
starting point. The EIARP's institutional framework is drawn from the 
larger decision-making structure. The actors in the process are from a 
variety of political, administrative and economic institutions generally 
concerned with environmental management. They, and the public, are linked 
through a set of rules specifying the actions and decisions within the 
EIARP. The rules may be formalized, as public laws or as administrative 
procedures, or they may be implicit norms (individual or collective percep-
tions and attitudes), governing behaviour. The EIARP specifies its 
purposive nature (as goals and objectives) through its policy and planning 
bases. These are variably translated into formalized procedures for 
substantively influencing decision-making. 
The question then arises, how should the institutional framework of the 
EIARP be designed to substantively influence decision-making? The task of 
institutional design generally is to distribute resources among organizations 
and to formulate a set of rules governing their behaviour, so that 
decision-making reflects the social values in question (Fox, 1976). It also 
appears that key requirements of an institutional framework are its managing 
of conflict and structuring of power (Etzioni, 1968). 
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The historical context of an EIARP is an important variable, as it is within 
a particular social and institutional setting that a formalized procedure 
begins operations. Most countries with operative EIARPs have incorporated 
their procedures into a range of policy-making and planning institutions for 
environmental management (e.g. land-use planning and pollution controls) . 
In establishing the EIARP, questions arise concerning the relationship and 
integration of new organizations and procedures with current management 
practices. The diversity of organizational arrangements is simply too great 
to accurately capture. However, some generalizations follow from the EIARPs 
surveyed for this study. Nearly all operative EIARPs have a separate, more 
or less independent administrative agency, ftU1ctioning as the reviewer and/or 
overview authority. This may be a department, ministry or an ad hoc agency, 
variously linked with other government institutions. The reviewer may have 
a mix of advisory and executive functions; where these are executive functions, 
some over-view body is usually established as well (e.g. the U.S. Council 
on Environment Quality) . The relationship between the reviewer and other 
agencies appears to be a critical consideration. It is an indication of the 
political and administrative status (or legitimacy) of environment management 
as a state responsibility. 
However, the partiCUlar existence of agencies is perhaps less important 
than the specification of their activities through a formalized EIARP. 
Formalized rules are a procedural device to implement the EIARP. The design 
and operation of rules is thus critical to the substantive success of the 
process. Again, generalizations are difficult to make concerning the variety 
of experiences with formalized procedures. However, the most significant 
question appears to be whether to adopt formal (legal) or informal (admin-
istrative) procedures. 
NEPA provided an early model for a legislative EIARP, which was generally 
not followed by other countries until some experience was gained under informal 
procedures. The U.S. tradition of involvement of the courts in policy-making, 
as well as a vaguely worded statute, were reasons for significant judicial 
influence in NEPA's implementation. Vigorous interest group participation 
also assisted (Andrews, 1976). Thus, political accountability and interest 
group influences were explicitly defined through a statutory procedure for 
"environmental protection". In other western countries, a greater reliance 
on implicit and discretionary decision-making generally prevails. The role 
of the judiciary is different, and central level institutional frameworks 
for environmental management generally exist in a coherent form. Thus, 
generally informal processes were introduced, and still largely exist in 
other countries. 
Criticisms of the legal basis of NEPA centre on the fixed nature of formal 
procedures. Efforts were seen to concentrate on the procedure itself, to 
the detriment of substance, because of the constant threat of litigation 
(e.g. Fairfax, 1978). However, there is general agreement that NEPA 
has influenced decision-making through an explicit policy basis and an 
enforceable though ad hoc policy instrument (Dreyfus arid Ingram, 1976; 
Caldwell, 1979). 
Canadian and Australian processes are variably legal and administrative but 
mostly the latter. With one or two exceptions (e.g. Ontario, New South 
Wales), all are characterized by a poorly developed policy basis, and broad 
discretionary powers are given to. the Qrganizations involved- (Rees, .1980 i 
Lucas, ·1981 iFowler, 1981). 
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This arrangement is considered to weaken the substantive scope, and the form 
and systematic nature of activities in Australian processes. Administrative, 
public and judicial review is generally limited (Ryan, 1975; Fowler, 1981). 
Fowler bounds these conclusions by noting a significant lack of information 
on and analysis of decision-making outcomes. 
Rees (1980) and Lucas (1981) recognise a need for generally stronger legal 
bases for Canadian processes. In their view this is to ensure that the 
substance of the process is achieved (presumably through greater prescription) 
and to structure (political) power more clearly. 
However, as shown in previous discussions, there are many variables in a 
particular decision-making process which may determine the effectiveness 
of the EIARP. Wandesforde-Smith (1980a) notes that the use of legal 
instruments: "may be an important variable in some countries under some 
conditions, but it is w1likely to determine in and of itself the effectiveness 
of EIA in any country". The effectiveness of the institutional framework 
is related to its internal structuring, as well as to the external links 
with other structures in the decision-making process. The formalized 
basis can, to a significant extent determine both. That is, it specifies 
the limits of who is required (by law or not) to do what, and when, and how. 
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But great uncertainty exists concerning the influence of social norms within 
institutions, as well as the stochastic nature of the managed environment. 
This uncertainty is what is colloquially referred to as the "real world". 
The diverse nature and the linkages between individual and collective values 
influencing actual administrative behaviour is largely unstudied. Further, 
random changes in the environment (social and physical) may significantly 
affect the substantive outcome of decision-making, whatever the institutional 
design. 
Holling et al. (1978) draw parallels between social and institutional systems, 
and ecological and physical systems. They note the strong historical and 
spatial interconnections between institutions; and their complex, nonlinear 
responses to change which may disclose several areas of behavioural stability. 
The complexities and uncertainties of modelling the EIARP are reflected in 
the question of institutional design. A normative analysis is possible in 
only the most general terms. As Fox (1976) states: 
"Institutions must be designed in the light of individual 
and organizational behaviour, and adapted to the physical 
and governmental environment in which they are to be 
applied. " 
The institutional framework for the EIARP must incorporate the normative 
criteria developed so far in this study. The objectives of the framework 
should be interpreted comprehensively, and a flexible approach followed 
in the design. In this way, the EIARP can adaptively respond to uncertainty. 
The existence of social as well as physical uncertainties requires the iterative 
structuring of the framework to express both conflicting social values and 
uncertain facts concerning development and its implications. In a political 
sense, such an approach is needed for the resolution of conflicts and the 
legitimation of decisions. Formal analyses of social and institutional 
systems (e.g. Etzioni, 1968) stress the need for explicit expression of the 
conflicts in social values underlying institutional behaviour. Related to 
the question of legitimation is the need to clearly structure the power among 
actors. Integration of the framework with other decision-making structures 
is therefore needed, as is formalized separation of the various influences 
of the actors within the process. These requirements imply a need to 
formalize the institutional framework to the extent that explicitness does 
not negate flexibility, and also that discretionary powers need limiting 
to a similar extent. 
PART III 
CHAPTER FOUR THE NEW ZEALAND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT PROCEDURES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The first two parts of this study have been concerned with explaining the 
nature and purpose of the environmental impact assessment and review process. 
A normative framework has been developed as a prescriptive model of the 
process. This framework is necessarily abstract; and simply consists of 
a set of normative criteria, against which the design and operations of any 
particular process may be assessed. This chapter analyzes the design 
and implementation of the New Zealand EIARP and evaluates its effectiveness 
in the light of the framework developed. 
The historical context and evolution of the New Zealand EIARP is explained 
as a basis for the identification and evaluation of substantive and procedural 
problems. The analytical route chosen -has made reference to a range of 
experiences of decision-making under the New Zealand process. In the study, 
I have not undertaken exhaustive analyses of specific case histories, because 
single cases are inevitably limited in the range of problems they disclose, 
and the conclusions that may be drawn. The analysis therefore attempts to 
be systemic rather than strictly empirical. 
The New Zealand Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (EPEP) 
are a set of formalized administrative procedures, in operation since 
1 March 1974. The New Zealand Commission for the Environment (CFE) was 
established by Cabinet Minute on 7 August 1972, following the creation 
of a Ministerial portfolio for the Environment in February of that year. 
CFE has existed since then as a non-statutory administrative agency, with 
multiple functions for environmental management in New Zealand (CFE, 1976). 
Its major responsibility is as the administrative body for the EPEP, acting 
as the reviewer and overview authority. Extensions to the EPEP in 1978 
formalized the overview function. The National Development Act 1979 
mandated the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR) and audit 
for "proposed works of national importance". 
made to the Procedures in 1981. 
Further amendments were 
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The history of operations and critical analyses of the EPEP are sparsely 
documented. Annual Reports of CFE provide official information on EIA 
and review activities carried out since 1974. Several legal analyses 
have provided a continuing commentary on the role and effectiveness of the 
EPEP, latterly in connection with the National Development Act 1979 (Mills, 
1979a, b, c; Williams, 1980; Black, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982; Kenderdine, 1982). 
A few studies have briefly analyzed or commented on the relationship of the 
EPEP with planning processes in New Zealand (Lello, 1976; Nahkies, 1976; 
Brunt, 1978; Morgan, 1981). An important source of information on the 
operations of the EPEP has been the internal files of CFE, as well as 
communications with officers of the Commission. 
4.2 HISTORY OF OPERATIONS 
The following is an analysis of the evolution of the implementation of the 
EPEP as a formalized EIARP in New Zealand. It attempts to draw out and 
explain important factors influencing the effectiveness of implementation. 
The social environment in New Zealand during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was considerably influenced in its thinking by an enhanced international 
awareness of the aesthetic and ecological significance of the physical 
environment. This changing awareness resulted in a.nurnber of institutional 
responses in central government, cUlminating in the establishment of the 
CFE and implementation of the EPEP. The National Development Conference 
in 1968 included an environmental section as one of 14 sector councils. 
63. 
In 1970, the Physical Environment Conference led to the formation of the 
Environmental Council as a government appointed advisory agency on 
environmental policy. In late 1971 the National Government formed a Cabinet 
Committee for the Environment, which then set up a departmental liaising and 
advisory body, the Officials Committee for the Environment (OCFE). 
In February 1972 the Government created a Ministerial portfolio for the 
Environment, "to give weight to environmental matters in Cabinet", with Hon. 
D. MacIntyre as the first Minister. Mr. MacIntyre, and the 13 senior 
departmental administrators comprising OCFE, saw their joint responsibilities 
as being the co-ordination of environmental information for the resolution 
of environmental issues. 
for the environment. 
OCFE were to function as an informal "department" 
This internal, administrative style of environmental management evidently 
had the support of the officials involved. An attempt early in 1972 to provide 
a statutory basis for the Environment Council failed through lack of support 
from OCFE. The OCFE opposed the move on the grounds that the growing 
institutional framework for environmental management had not been finalized, 
and that such a move would pre-empt their own influence on government policy. 
Soon after, OCFE confirmed its preference for individual departmental 
responsibility for environmental control, rather than a separate or all-
embracing agency. 
In May 1972~ however, the Minister for the Environment announced a study to 
formulate procedures requiring EIA, for all government development proposals 
Prior to approval. There is little information available to establish the 
precise origin of this impetus. However, contact between the Minister 
and U.N. Environmental Programme officials appears to have been the likely 
source. The move enjoyed some measure of departmental support, as OCFE, in 
ratifying the terms of reference of the study, noted the advantages of such 
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a procedure as being increased social benefits through less environmental 
damage; greater design awareness; a mechanism to increase public acceptance 
of projects; and generally closer departmental ties. These were recognised, 
despite OeFE's perception of possible increases in time and costs for 
projects. 
On 7 August 1972 the National Government established the Commission for the 
Environment (CFE) by Cabinet Minute. In September, the Cabinet Secretary, 
Mr. P.J. Brooks, was appointed as the first Commissioner for the Environment. 
CFE was established as a result of the Government's wish to have an 
administrative agency responsible to the Minister for the Environment, for 
investigation and advice on environmental policies and issues. The General 
Election and a change of government meant that the Commissioner and his 
Commission did not begin operations until early in 1973. 
CFE spent 1973 finalizing its administrative-procedures, and establishing 
contact with environmental bodies within New Zealand and overseas. The 
EPEP began as a draft prepared the previous year by OCFE and ratified by the 
National Cabinet before the change of government. Riding on the tide of 
environmental concern, the incoming Labour Government was anxious to fulfil 
its election manifesto by formally introducing the Procedures. In July 
1973 a semifinal draft of the EPEP was released by the Minister for the 
Environment (Hon. J.A. Walding) for public and departmental comment. 
The later draft closely resembled that which would be finally approved by 
Cabinet in November 1973. The original OCFE draft had been extended by 
CFE to apply to private as well as government proposals through the criteria 
of statutory consent or public funding requirements. Under the Procedures, 
proposals which were determined to have a significant environmental impact 
following an initial "environmental assessment", then required an EIR 
prepared by or on behalf of the proponent. The EIR was to be published, 
and public and departmental comments received by CFE as the administrative 
teviewer, were to be incorporated into an tlaudit" of the EIR by CFE, also 
Published. The EIR and audit accompanied the application for funding 
and/or approval, "before any decision is taken". The Commissioner, in 
his first annual to Parliament, paraphrased the draft EPEP in 
describing the EIR as not simply a "justification for predetermined plans 
but (an) impartial assessment of the likely consequences for the environment 
if particular actions were taken." He regarded the audit as environmental 
assessment of the project, "in much the same way as Treasury assesses 
proposals from an economic and financial point of view"(Commissioner for the 
Environment, 1973). While the concept of EIA sprang from the u.s. process 
under NEPA, the EPEP were in fact closely modelled on the Canadian Federal 
EIARP (FEARP), which was being formulated at the same time. 
Some 150 written submissions on the draft EPEP were received. While most 
approved of their intent, some disquiet was expressed by government agencies 
at all levels concerning the EPEP's relationship with statutory procedures 
for development approval. Members of the OCFE specifically criticized: 
the extended scope covering local authority and private proposals; 
the publication of EIRs and audits; 
the possible duplication with statutory procedures requiring public 
involvement (notably with the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 and the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967); 
the pressures, delays and costs resulting from the above. 
A press statement reporting the above criticisms by the Commissioner of Works, 
was in response publicly defended by the Commissioner for the Environment 
(The Auckland Star 20,21 September 1973) . 
A further draft released in October included a list of statutes under which 
the EPEP were to apply, with the above two statutes absent from the list. 
Despite this, the wording of the EPEP contained a clear general requirement 
for the assessment of all proposals "which may affect the environment." 
The requirement applied to both public and private proposals via the 
criteria of public funding and statutory consents. The reason for non-
inclusion of the two Acts appears to have been to mollify the concern of the 
Ministry of Works (which administered both Acts) regarding duplication. 
Further, it was thought that the Town and Country Planning Act would be 
revised in 1974 and thus its inclusion in the EPEP was inappropriate (A. 
Hutchison, pers. comm.). The Town and Country Planning Act Review Committee 
Published their report in November and vigorously repeated the criticism 
of uncoordination and duplication. 
On 12 November 1973 the EPEP were finally approved by Cabinet Minute and 
Published (CFE, 1973). In December, Mr. I.L. Baumgart, formerly Assistant 
Director-General of DSIR, was appointed Commissioner for the Environment 
in succession to Mr. P.J. Brooks. 
experience. 
The stage was set for the New Zealand 
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The EPEP became officially operative on 1 March 1974. Their early operations 
were seen by those committed to the concept of EIA, as a new experiment in 
environmental management in New Zealand. However, it was clear that the 
administrative establishment regarded them as a more or less confusing, 
duplicative and unwelcome intrusion into its various domains of influence. 
Throughout the next few years CFE was at pains to explain and defend the 
intent of the EPEP (e.g. Baumgart and Datson, 1974; Baumgart, 1976), 
particularly in relation to statutory planning processes. Later, when the 
connections became more obvious, the relationship between the New Zealand 
EIARP and governmental policy-making required continual clarification (e.g. 
Commissioner for the Environment, 1977, 1978, 1981; Piddington (cited in 
National Business Review 28 September 1981). 
Administrative and public confusion over the purpose, concepts, terminology 
and form of EPEP became obvious soon after its implementation. The 
inconsistent and vague wording caused genuin~ misunderstanding, particularly 
the relationship between the "environmental (impact) assessment" (as an 
initial substantive EIA) and the "environmental impact report" (EIR) (as a 
further substantive EIA). Further, the informal status of the Procedures 
gave sufficient discretion to government agencies to selectively wldertake 
less formal "assessments" for all but obviously significant projects. This 
practice was increasingly endorsed by CFE for pragmatic reasons (Commissioner 
for the Environment, 1975, 1976, 1977). Finally, the interrelationship 
of the EPEP with statutory procedures requiring public involvement was 
considered by many central and local government agencies to require clarification 
When approving the EPEP, Cabinet had requested a review by OCFE after a 
year of operations. In January 1975 CFE sent a questionnaire to various 
local institutions and interest groups seeking comment on the operation and 
effectiveness of the EPEP. In particular, comment was sought on their 
relationship with statutory procedures, and the extent of public involvement 
under the EPEP. Departmental and ministerial comment was also sought. 
Relative unfamiliarity with the EPEP and a variety of vested interests 
provoked a wide range of opinion. 
were: 
Key criticisms of substantive aspects 
Too narrow a scope of application (only public actions appeared to apply, 
unless private proposals were caught by the statutory consent or funding 
criteria). The absence of mention of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1953 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 probably provoked this 
criticism. The annual report for 1974 noted that only two out of 17 
proposals assessed were from the private sector (Commissioner for the 
Enviromnent,1975). The report referred to the "voluntary" encouragement 
of private sector assessment, implying appreciation of the informal status 
of the EPEP, rather than confusion over the intended scope. 
Definitions of "enviromnent" and "significant impact" were very generally 
specified, thus the scope of assessment was quite open to interpretation and 
discretion. 
The relationship between the EPEP and statutory planning. Criticisms 
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were sharply divided. On the one hand, the professional planning establish-
ment considered that the EPEP ought to be subsumed under town and country planning 
procedures and was therefore unnecessary except for "large and unique projects" 
(Wellington Regional Planning Authority) . On the other hand, certain 
deficiencies of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 were highlighted in 
arguing for the retaining of separate, strengthened Procedures. The 
Environmental Defence Society (EDS) pointed out that the potential scope of 
the EPEP was much broader than the above statute, despite their limited 
application in practice. The lack of application to policy proposals (e.g. 
nuclear and electric power generation) was cited as an example of this limited 
use. Further, it was considered that the inherent structure of statutory 
planning processes created problems for the early and systematic assessment 
of specific development proposals. EDS considered that the narrow and 
belated focussing on consent applications ignored the (normative) need for 
such assessments, particularly of alternatives. There are striking 
parallels between this debate and the debate among British planners concerning 
the value of an EIARP in planning processes in Britain (e.g. Catlow and 
Thirlwall,1976; Clark, Bisset and Wathern, 1981). 
Procedural criticisms of EPEP emphasized the potential for delays in develop-
ment planning because of the EPEP's requirements (too much public involvement 
being cited as one of the disadvantages). In contrast, others thought that 
there was too little public notification of the commencement or completion 
of formalized activities. This, and proponent bias in the EIR, were 
among the reasons given by many for the need to give a formal (legal) status 
to the EPEP. 
Early in 1975, with the EPEP review in mind, the Commissioner for the 
Environment (Mr. I.G. Baumgart) spent several weeks overseas visiting a 
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number of administrations. The Commission saw their task as being to raise 
the effect of their operations to a level where they were catalyzing 
governmental and public attention on environmental considerations in public 
policy-making. This was seen as being more effective than simply reacting 
to agency proposals through the audit procedure. However, as this 
"anticipatory" role developed, and public support for the Commission with it, 
so also·grew the constraining influences in the institutional environment. 
Throughout 1975, OCFE oversaw a revision by the Commission of the EPEP. 
The Minister for the Environment recommended to Cabinet the revision's 
approval and it was printed for circulation. Cabinet deferred a decision 
pending the outcome of the General Election that November. Following the 
election, a National Government similarly deferred approval, pending the 
outcome of the review of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 and the 
completion of the report by the Task Force on Economic and Social Planning. 
This revision was never approved. 
The lapsed revision of the EPEP indicated the DfficiallY perceived shortcomings 
of the original Procedures. As Mills (1979c) observes, the revision 
attempted to increase the flexibility of the EPEP. It also intended to 
establish an earlier influence by CFE over assessment activities. The 
resulting document created an involved and potentially lengthy process. 
New terminology was introduced for successive assessment activities. 
"Environmental (impact) appraisal" now referred to the assessment process 
and EIAs and EIRs the documented products of successive "appraisals". CFE 
, 
as the administrative reviewer was empowered to require the proponent to 
prepare an initial EIA, and to decide on whether a subsequent EIR was 
necessary. Previously this had been at the proponent's discretion. With 
the intention of greater integration of the EPEP with statutory processes, 
the Commission's decision was to be tempered by the adequacy of assessment 
and public involvement under the relevant statutes. The lapsed revision 
lengthened the EIARP by providing for an iteration of the EIR. Public and 
administrative comments on a "provisional" EIR would be forwarded to the 
proponent (as under the u.s. model). The proponent would then revise the 
EIR and submit it to CFE for aUditing. Some of the above features fore-
shadowed changes finally approved in 1978. 
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By 1976 CFE was obviously feeling the strain of auditing increasing numbers 
of EIRs (Commissioner for the Environment, 1976). Twenty one EIRs were 
audited in 1975, the highest number in any year previously or since. It is 
evident that the discretionary screening ("assessment") process allowed 
inconsistent application of proposals at an advanced planning stage (op.cit.). 
Proposals were either not formally applied ("assessments" only) or were 
applied when policy options had been foreclosed through political or 
. administrative investment. Examples from this period include the development 
proposal for the Maui gas field (Maui Project EIR and audit, 1974), and the 
Upper Clutha River hydro-electric power proposals (Upper Clutha Valley 
Development EIR and audit, 1975). The 1976 annual report of CFE advocated 
establishing a greater influence for itself earlier in development planning. 
A selective application of the Procedures to the "most significant projects" 
would then reduce the Commission's auditing workload and allow for more 
effective operations. 
The CFE policy to reduce the number of audits (Commissioner for the 
Environment, 1977, 1978) and departmental use of the EPEP, resulted in their 
increasingly informal application. The Waiau Plains Irrigation Scheme 
proposal by the Ministry of Works serves as an example of the departmental 
practice adopted. The Ministry designed the scheme, obtained approval in 
pr~nciple, applied for a water right, then prepared a documented, informal 
assessment. Because of the EPEP requirement for a formal EIR and audit, the 
Ministry renamed the published document as an EIR before release. The 
Ministry evidently considered further formal assessment as unnecessary 
(Waiau Plains Irrigation Scheme audit, 1976). What was essentially at issue 
was an understanding of the role of the environmental assessment in the 
EPEP, the perceived 8i~1ificance of the impacts of the irrigation proposal, 
and hence the adequacy of assessment and public participation. 
The Commissioner was moved to observe in 1977 that U(m)any people do not 
understand the full role of the Commission •.. " (Commissioner for the 
Environment, 1977). However, that role had by this time become quite 
dichotomous. The "initiating [policy-influencing] capability" and the 
"largely react(ive) (EPEP) responsibilities" were being progressively 
separated because of departmental tensions concerning CFE's "legitimate 
sphere of operations". On the one hand, the increasing internalization by 
agencies of assessment activities, pragmatically endorsed by CFE, resulted 
in situations as extreme as the above case. On the other hand, CFE's own 
informal policy assessment activities, for example on energy policies 
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(nuclear, hydro-electric power development), were the main examples of . 
generic EIAs, and did not generally stimulate policy/programme assessments. 
Departments selectively chose to undertake examinations of policy issues within 
specific (project) EIAs that followed. Natural gas development was already 
and would increasingly become a case in point. 
The question of the relationship between the EPEP and statutory procedures 
continued to surface. In 1976 the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board 
(now renamed the Planning Tribunal) heard appeals on the granting of a water 
right for the Waiau Plains proposal (Environmental Defence Society and 
Cheviot C.C. v the NWASCA and MOW (1976) 6 NZTPA:49). The Board held that 
both EIR and audit were inadmissable as evidence unless referred to by expert 
witnesses. The Board apparently saw the (then) narrow standing requirement 
being compromised by the potential admission of the views of all interested 
parties (Mills, 1979c). While then able to admit a wide range of material 
as evidence, the Board declined to do so. 
However in early 1977, by Ministerial arrangement, the Commission was able to 
appear and give evidence at local authority hearings concerning consents 
for the proposed Auckland Thermal I Power Station. This arrangement was later 
formalized (see below) . 
In January 1977 the Minister for the Environment (Hon. V. Young) announced 
a further review of the EPEP to "supercede" the lapsed 1975 revision. This 
review aimed at streamlining and simplifying " .. without diminishing existing 
rights of public participation" (Commissioner for the Environment, 1977). 
The Commissioner stated in his report CFE's policy concerning the "distinct" 
functions of the EPEP and statutory procedures, and contrasted the consultative 
approach of the EPEP with the adversary nature of the latter (op. cit.). This 
statement appeared, despite concern in the same report at the lack of CFE's 
legal status and the need to integrate planning and the EPEP. The 
Commission's equivocal stance was probably related to the fact that a revised 
Town and Country Planning Act was to be presented to Parliament later that year. 
The EPEP revision continued throughout 1977 in complete isolation from MWD 
drafting of revised planning legislation. This occurred, despite an 
authoritative recommendation by the Holmes Committee report "New Zealand at 
the Turning Point" (Task Force on Economic and Social Planning, 1976). 
The Task Force recommended that statutory provision for "impact reporting" 
procedures be integrated into the revised Town and Country Planning Act to 
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remove the apparent confusion between the two processes. Legal establishment 
of CFE as the administrative reviewer (but not as the overview authority) was 
also recommended. 
In September 1977, correspondence between MWD and CFE indicated surprise that 
the EPEP were being revised, as, with the incorporation of "environmental 
considerations ... at many stages" in the revised Act, the EPEP were "barely 
relevant". At the end of 1977, the Town and Country Planning Act was passed, 
with no reference to EPEP or its activities; and the revision of the EPEP 
lay idle. The continuation of the status quo was criticized by the editor 
of the New Zealand Law Journal (Black, 1977), who noted the "incomplete" nature 
of the planning legislation. 
Early in 1978 the Commission took steps to more formally broaden the role of 
the EPEP, following the trends of the previous three years. The annual 
report presaged this formalization, expressing the intent to increase 
flexibility of operations by moving further into an initiating policy-oriented 
role and de-emphasizing the formal EIR and audit process. 
"It remains the Commission's policy that the projects 
subject to the full Procedures should be limited by 
a process of careful selection ... (to) ensure (application) 
only when that is the most appropriate and effective way 
of carrying out the environmental investigation required" 
(Commissioner for the Environment, 1978). 
On 29 May 1978 the National Cabinet sanctioned the de facto changes in the 
operations of the EPEP. 
Minute were: 
The substantive changes confirmed by Cabinet 
Increased departmental responsibility to incorporate the EPEP within 
their activities via internal assessments. 
An overview role by CFE of the effectiveness of the above. 
Increased discretionary application of the EPEP by CFE via EIRs and 
audits, for proposals "for which this procedure is best suited". A corollary 
of this was that the CFE could vary the EPEP to suit particular circumstances. 
The making of "independent submissions" by CFE to statutory authorities 
and the Planning Tribunal by Ministerial arrangement "within the procedures 
for the submission of the Crown case". 
Legal comment on the Cabinet approved extensions was favourable (e.g. Black, 
1978), and the value of the integration of environmental assessment information 
with statutory planning procedures was noted, despite some doubt concerning 
the "independence" of CFE submissions. Black raised the question of public 
involvement within what was presumed to become an increasingly internalized 
and selective operation. 
A circular to departments and local authorities (CFE, 1978) in September 
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was a consolidation of intent following recent practice and Cabinet approval. 
It gave a statement of CFE's objectives, and emphasized its "flexible and 
evolving" role. The EPEP were "confirmed within the framework of the 
changes". 
However, the uncertainties alluded to by Black (1978) were strongly echoed 
by Mills (1979a, b, c) in his legal analysis of the EPEP's intent and practice 
to 1978. In Mills' view, uncertainty derived from the increasing selectivity 
approved for an already highly discretionary process. Mills criticized the 
vaguely worded nature of the "assessment" (a "process") and its links with 
the EIR and audit (both documents) in the original Procedures. The increasing 
misuse of assessments, selectively removed from wider scrutiny, and pragmatically 
supported by CFE, led to Cabinet ratification of a weakened process (Mills, 
1979c). 
The April 1979 Newsletter of CFE restated its newly formalized role. Four 
"methods" (alternative procedures) of environmental evaluation were identified 
from the scope of the expanded EPEP. Following "feasibility studies" of a 
conceptualized proposal, the proponent was to make a decision on the method 
of environmental evaluation to be followed (analogous to "decision to screen", 
Chapter 3, Figure 5).· Following this decision the first possible alternative 
was the immediate preparation of an EIR and its audit. The second was the 
preparation of an EIA as an initial assessment (Figure 5). Following a 
decision ("decision on screening", Figure 5), either no further assessment 
under the EPEP or an EIR and audit would result. The third alternative 
was described as a "variant" of the above routes, "designed to suit the 
circumstances of the project". The final alternative was to defer any 
formalized assessment (effectively a negative screening decision, Figure 5) 
until some assessment was otherwise required under the relevant statutory 
consent procedures. The criteria to be applied by the proponent in the 
initial (screening) decision where statutory procedures would later be 
involved, were the adequacy of information on the proposal; the "thoroughness" 
of any statutory evaluation required; and the opportunities for public 
involvement. 
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Under this newly formalized authority, the Commission in early 1979 took 
part in local authority hearings for consent applications by the Natural Gas 
Corporation (NGC) for its proposed Ammonia/Urea plant at Kapuni, Taranaki. 
NGC's planning report included an assessment, and was subject to an "appraisal" 
by CFE. A further report was prepared by NGC and all documents were used 
in the hearings. However, and almost predictably, proposal planning was 
already well underway before CFE involvement occurred. Government approval 
inrprinciple had been given, the site and the technology had already been 
bought. CFE's role was evidently constrained by late influence and time 
limits· (Proposed AmriIonia Urea Fertilizer Complex, Kapuni. E. I. appraisal, 
1979). The Planning Tribunal appeal hearing in April 1980 (Smith v 
Waimate West C.C. & E.D.S. v Taranaki C.C. (1980) 7 NZTPA:241) saw no 
significant involvement by CFE or its documentation. 
political events now began increasingly to shape the operations of CFE. 
The National Development Act 1979 (NDA) was passed by the National Government 
in late 1979: "to provide for the prompt consideration of proposed works of 
national importance by the direct referral of the proposals to the Planning 
Tribunal for an enquiry and report and by providing for such works to receive 
the necessary consents" (NDA 1979 Long Title) . The National Government, 
returned to. power in 1978, viewed NDA as a convenient legislative device for 
executing .its development programme. 
The NDA procedure gave a statutory role to the Commissioner for the 
Environment and to the EIR and audit documents. Following an executive 
decision to apply the Act to a public or private proposal ("a major work") 
(s.3) ·the proponent was required to prepare and publish an EIR which was then 
audited by the Commissioner after public submissions were received (s.5). 
The Commissioner was empowered to be present and be heard at the single 
Planning Tribunal inquiry into all statutory consents the proposal required 
(s.7,8). Following a report and recommendation by the Tribunal (s.10) 
an executive decision was made on the work (s.ll). 
Criticism of the Act centred on the vast sweep of executive power over 
statutory procedures and final decision-making, together with rigid time 
constraints imposed on public, administrative and judicial review of the 
Proposal. The involvement of the Commissioner and EIA and review activities 
Was belated and incompletely specified. The Act gave no clear indication of 
the nature and purpose of the EIR and audit, and made no connection between 
this procedure and the Tribunal inquiry. These uncertainties were noted 
by Black (1979, 1981) and were the subject inter alia of a 1981 amendment 
following the first inquiries under NDA. 
On 1 April 1980 Mr. I.L. Baumgart retired after seven years as Commissioner 
and Mr. K.W. piddington was appointed his successor. In his final annual 
report (Commissioner for the Environment, 1980), Baumgart noted the 
Government's development programme for the years ahead, and the intended 
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role of NDA. He emphasized once more the need for "anticipatory" environmental 
policy-making to be integrated with such developments. A brief statement 
of "government policy on environmental evaluation" also appeared. This was 
actually a restatement of intents articulated by OCFE and CFE at the beginning 
of the EPEP's operations: "Full consideration of environmental matters" 
was to be given in decision-making "at all levels •.• authoritative information" 
was to be made available to the public for its part, and the mechanisms for 
achieving these aims were to be "as simple and direct as possible". A 1980 
reprint of the original EPEP included the 1978 amendments and a note 
referring to the provisions of NDA (CFE, 1980). 
In 1980 several events took place which led to further change in the formalized 
operations of the EPEP. These are briefly chronicled in order to indicate 
the intimate connections between and influences on the EPEP's operations by 
administrative and political institutions. 
In July 1980 CFE audited the EIR for a proposal for a combined pulp mill 
and sawmill near Nelson (CSR - Baigent Thermomechanical pulp Mill Proposal 
EIR and audit 1980). The CSR - Baigent consortium's proposal was viewed 
by the Government as a positive example of its encouragement of overseas 
investment for the economic development programme it supported (e.g. Minister 
of National Development, 1980). The EIR concentrated on the initial 
proposal, which was stated to be the first stage of a larger industrial 
complex to be established on the site chosen. Because of the likely 
cumulative impacts, the Commission's audit considered that the proposal 
raised "important questions" concerning regional resource development, 
particularly concerning water, land, power and transport requirements. 
The audit commented critically on on-site water requirements, processing 
technology and likely pollution levels, as well as regional planning 
implications. It recommended withholding approvals until site selection, 
water and air impacts and other planning considerations had been reassessed. 
The audit evidently influenced a local authority hearing which rejected 
a change to the district scheme to accommodate the proposal. Through a 
variety of circumstances, the project was later abandoned. The audit was 
discussed by Cabinet Committee in August, which queried the apparent role 
that (CFE) saw for itself in economic and social matters (emphasis added). 
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A statement of the Commission's "precise functions and duties" was called for. 
The Commissioner responded by preparing a paper outlining the officially 
recognized functions, and emphasizing the "anticipatory" planning function 
of early assessment as a complement to Treasury advice. The Commissioner 
defended the consideration of alternatives in EIRs and audits. Each 
development option presented a range of environmental impacts with associated 
costs and benefits. The auditing function was to advise on the "least cost" 
option in both "economic" and "environmental" terms. The Commissioner 
also noted that environmental considerations of project- design (involving 
resource use) were related to decisions on policy. Thus, policy matters 
were an inevitable part of any environmental assessment. 
Later that year, OCFE meetings were called to discuss Cabinet concern at the 
Commission's influences on development planning through its operations. OCFE 
supported the need for early consultation bet~een CFE and the proponent, and 
for the Conunission to identify "information gaps" in its audit. However, 
the contentious issue of the scope of an audit received some debate. A 
divergence of opinion existed between those wanting a narrower scope adopted, 
and those who saw the present scope as adequate. A draft paper for the 
Cabinet Committee which was disclosed to the press in early December, advocated 
a substantively restricted scope for the EIR and audit, specifically excluding 
from the audit a consideration of "economic aspects" and "policy questions". 
Further, the audit scope would be substantially determined by that of the EIR. 
These recommendations drew a critical response from the Minister for the 
Environment (N.Z. Herald 8,9 December 1980). However, these recommendations 
were subsequently agreed to by Cabinet. In a press statement following the 
Cabinet confirmation, the Minister for the Environment emphasized that there 
was no intention by the Government to restrict the Commission'S involvement 
in the EIR and audit process. The Minister stated: "The Government wishes 
to clearly delineate the boundaries between environmental assessment and 
economic policy". The Cabinet decision referred the question of consideration 
in the audit of alternative technologies and emission controls back to 
the OCFE and CFE for further study. 
The decision created a difficult position for the Commission, which realized 
the substantive conflicts between the decision and the currently operative 
Procedures. There was also an implied conflict between the approved 
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changes and a provision of NDA requiring the Commissioner to "act independently 
and .•. not be subject to the directions of ... any ... Minister" (NDA 1979 
s. 2) • 
At the time these events took place,the activities and subsequent conclusions 
of an international panel of environmental administrators provided a contrast-
ing irony. In March 1981 the DCFE discussed the recommendations of an DECD 
Review Panel's report on environmental management policies and practices in 
New Zealand, particularly those concerned with institutional arrangements. 
The DECD Review had been undertaken during 1980 at the Government's request, 
and was publicly released in April 1981 (DECD, 1981). 
The Review Panel recommended the statutory establishment of a central environ-
mental agency, as a ministry or a department, to advise an environmental 
policy-making at government level. It foresaw the Commission as fulfilling 
this role. However the Review suggested the use of a "council" to undertake 
the audit function, as a way of reducing what it recognized as the conflicting 
role of the Commissioner as a government advi-sor and public critic. The 
council was to be "independent", with appointed non-government membership, 
but was to have access to "relevant information" provided by the environmental 
agency. 
The DCFE agreed on the need for a statutorily based central environmental 
agency as a ministry, to advise and coordinate environmental policy and 
administer the EPEP. However, they did not support the idea of the audit 
function being removed to an "independent" council. The commissioner made 
light of the conflict in his current role, stressing the consultative rather 
than the adversary nature of administering the EPEP. The DCFE generally 
agreed, reiterating their support for early involvement of the Commission 
as a "ministry" in assessments of public proposals. 
In his first report to Parliament in 1981 the Commissioner for the Environment 
(Mr. K.W. Piddington) summarized these views. As had both the DECD Review 
Panel and DCFE, the Commissioner avoided the issue of the EPEP's integration 
with statutory planning procedures, by noting the need for the discretion to 
opt out if statutory procedures were "working effectively". Significantly, 
the Commissioner endorsed the value of generic ErA and review activities for 
policy proposals. He cautioned that an essential prerequisite for their 
effectiveness was an acceptance of the Procedures "as a legitimate avenue 
for floating policy changes" (emphasis added) (Commissioner for the 
Environment, 1981). 
The above views of public administrators illustrate the most significant 
procedural problem in the design of an institutional framework for an EIARP. 
That is, its formal relationship with established legal procedures, and 
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hence with administrative organizations for environmental management. OCFE 
confirmed their continuing preference for an internalized process, despite 
recognition of the need for a legal basis for the review/overview authority. 
The possibility of executive or control influences developing as a consequence 
of mandating the advisory functions of an environmental agency, appears to 
have escaped notice. 
The question of the Cabinet decision of December 1980 concerning changes 
to the EPEP's operations still remained. Throughout 1981 Commission staff 
prepared a number of reports which examined the modifications approved by 
Cabinet. Their problem was a microcosm of the normative conflicts between 
welfare economic assumptions and environmental management objectives 
(Chapter I), and is worth briefly reporting. CFE was placed in the position 
of having to defend a broad scope of environment for the EIR and audit, 
£ollowing an executive directive supported by departmental officials to 
exclude "economic aspects ... and (economic) policy questions". 
The commission firstly made the distinction between the environmental 
implications of a project which might affect its cost, and matters of broad 
economic policy. Supporting Commission reports then attempted to defend 
the discussion of "alternative technologies" and pollution controls (and the 
inevitable economic aspects) in the audit. CFE gave an analysis of what 
it saw as the present situation. It argued that the present sequence of 
decisions and the criteria used by a proponent for choosing a processing 
technology, was incapable of effectively internalizing the costs of pollution 
and thus mitigating adverse impacts through action design. Environmental 
assessment currently Jollowed a decision in principle on a proposal, so that 
real design options (for example, concerning technology, site, scale, and 
costs of pollution control) were largely foreclosed. Further, initial 
decisions were made on a "least cost" basis, using a narrow design criterion 
('best practicable means") against currently operative environmental 
standards (e.g. pollution controls, zoning restrictions) . CFE criticised 
the narrow scope of influence of such standards, in particular their limited 
capacity to require assessment of site options. CFE presented a normative 
argument for earlier assessment of environmental impacts, in conjunction 
with a design criterion which more effectively required the internalization 
of costs by reference to environmental standards (i.e. "best available 
technology economically achievable"); as well as strengthened standards. 
The assessment of design options would then be carried out in the EIR. 
Comment in the audit on options was then considered entirely justified by 
the Commissioner if not "adequately" assessed in the EIR. 
However, some officials were not moved by this argument, and essentially 
viewed the scope of the audit as being fixed by that of the EIR. An uneasy 
compromise was struck, in that in its initiating role, the Commission would 
assess or suggest for consideration by the proponent the environmental 
implications of options for resource use and technological design (i.e. 
policy assessment) . Then, the assessment of impacts of a range of options 
or of a specific option would take place in the EIR. "Project by project" 
consultation between the proponent, the commission and officials on the 
scope o·f the EIR would be undertaken before preparation. 
Information disclosed to the press in November 1981 indicated that Cabinet 
had approved a revision to the EPEP on the above lines. This was later 
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confirmed by the issuance of amended Procedures to departments on 23 November, 
just prior to the 1981 General Elections. In a press report the Commissioner 
indicated that he did not regard the revised EPEP a curtailment of his powers 
and that he hoped to give advice to the proponent "at a much earlier stage" 
(The Press 24 November 1981). 
In summary, the EPEP revision (CFE, 1982): 
formally incorporated the statutory procedures of NDA 1979 
rearranged and deleted some of the original provisions and 1978 amendments, 
in line with statutory amendments and the desire to remove references to 
administrative procedures "not appropriate in a public document". 
amended provisions concerning the scope of the EIR and audit. 
The incorporation of NDA procedures was in itself simply a consolidation, 
except that the time limits for audit preparation and for public submissions 
were increased. The 1978 provision formalizing the Commission's overview 
role now appeared at the beginning of the EPEP (cl. 1). The 1978 discretion 
for CFE to modify the assessment and review procedures was deleted apparently 
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to remove longstanding confusion (Commissioner for the Environment, 1981). 
The 1978 formalization of CFE involvement in statutory hearings had by now 
been statutorily endorsed by certain amendments, and the provision was deleted. 
In 1980 the Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act (s.3(2» provided for 
a joint Planning Tribunal hearing for related appeals under the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977 (TCPA 1977) (s.69) and the Water and Soil Conservation 
Act 1967 (WSCA 1967) (s. 25) . The Amendment Act also gave a much broader 
standing (to readily include the Commissioner among others) for those to be 
heard and to give evidence (s.3(3». However, legal problems of evidence 
concerning the EIR and audit, as indicated in E.D.8. and Cheviot C.C. v 
MOW and NWA8CA (1976) 6 NZTPA:49 (p.70) still applied, subject to TCPA 
1977 s.149(2). The contents of EIRs and audits could be supported by 
expert witnesses in such hearings. 
Further statutory amendments included the Mining Amendment Act 1981, which 
became the second environmental statute to formally integrate elements of the 
EPEP with a statutory consent procedure. The Amendment Act required the 
preparation of an environmental assessment to accompany a prospecting or 
mining licence application (s.21). Administrative review by local authorities 
is incorporated in their reports to the Minister of Energy (the executive 
authority) (s.25) who may require further "environmental enquiries" (Le. 
EIR and audit) . The Planning Tribunal receives "any environmental 
assessment", together with the licence application, Ministerially set 
conditions and any objections, before an inquiry (as a judicial review of the 
Minister's decision on the application) (s.32). The Commissioner for the 
Environment may be called to appear and give evidence on the audit (s.32). 
Further, the Planning Tribunal is required to "have regard" to a more 
explicitly broadened range of matters than would be considered under a town 
and country planning appeal (s.32). Finally, the scope of conditions (as 
mitigation measures) legally applicable to prospecting and mining licences 
is also substantively broadened (s.25). Enforcement of mitigation measures 
required is through a monetary bond lodged with the Ministry of Energy by 
a licence holder. 
procedures. 
However, the Amendment Act did not change inspection 
The National Development Act was also amended in 1981 to clearly allow the 
Commissioner for the Environment to give evidence and to make available 
witnesses for any Planning Tribunal inquiry under NDA. 
Substantive modifications by the EPEP revision to the intended nature and 
purpose of the EIR and audit are discussed in Chapter 4.3. 
The current situation (late 1982) concerning the formalized intent of the 
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EPEP is the same as at the end of 1981. The timing and scope of assessment 
is specified in general terms, subject to the discretion of agencies requiring 
or authorizing statutory consents, and the Commission's "early involvement". 
Screening activities are generally outlined and remain discretionary as above. 
The scope of the EIR and audit, while modified by the 1981 revision, is open 
to even greater unoertainty than previously. This is because the amendments 
are ambiguously related to original requirements, which are themselves 
ambiguous in application. The National Development Amendment Act 1981 and 
case law in 1981 have provided further definition of the nature of assessment 
and review activities for proposals under NDA (Kenderdine, 1982; palmer, 1982; 
Chapter 4.3). 
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4. 3 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS 
Developments in the nine year history of the Commission for the Enviroment 
and the Environmental Protection and Enchancement procedures have been 
outlined in order to illustrate the substantive and procedural problems in 
their operations. This section draws together what are considered to be the 
key limitations of the effectiveness of the EPEP. No analytical distinction 
has been forced between problems of substance and of procedure. However, 
questions concerning the redesign of the EPEP must consider the synergistic 
relationship of such problems (Part II). 
POLICY CONTEXT 
The policy context of the EPEP includes the existence and nature of a 
substantive policy basis for the EPEP, its relationship to other environmental 
management policies, and the influence of the policy and .operations of the 
EPEP on public policy-making in New Zealand. 
The policy basis for the EPEP has remained poorly defined, with weak substantive 
connections with other environmental management policies in New Zealand. 
Early official perceptions viewed the Procedures themselves as constituting 
complete and self-explanatory "policy" (e.g. Commissioner for the Environment, 
1973) . The original and current EPEP indicate substantive intent as being 
simply: "in order to protect and enhance the environment". Few governmental 
statements have bothered to elaborate on this intent. In 1980 the Commissioner 
summarized his interpretations of earlier pronouncements by officials (P.74) , 
in speaking of the policy of "full consideration of environmental matters 
[in decision-making] at all levels". This statement, coupled with the 
above intent in the EPEP, represents the formalized policy basis for the 
EPEP. 
This vague and highly informal indication of substantive intent of a 
public policy is reflected in the nature of its implementation. Application 
of the EPEP has been highly variable, and internal moves by CFE to re-examine 
and adapt the EPEP as a ppocedural instrument have had little substantive 
influence. External (governmental) re-examinations have probably weakened 
the substantive basis through procedural amendments. The 1978 extensions 
simply exacerbated the uncertainties already inherent (Chapter 4.2, Mills 
1979a, b, c). The mandating of certain procedural activities by NDA 
negated intended legitimization through the restrictive nature of the 
provisions (Black, 1979, 1981). The events culminating in the 1981 
revision of the EPEP demonstrated a significant lack of understanding and 
appreciation by policy-makers of the legitimacy of the EPEP, and, by 
implication, its policy basis. 
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The relationship between the policy basis of the EPEP and other environmental 
management policy is similarly uncertain. Despite an early history of 
policy-influencing bodies such as the Nature Conservation Council, the 
Environmental Council and the Commission for the Environment, environmental 
management policy remains functionally and administratively fragmented 
(OECD, 1981), Nature Conservation Council, 1981). While public support-for 
a strengthened policy stance undoubtedly exists (op.cit.), governmental 
legitimation remains problematic. If the institutional integration of 
policy intents provides a precondition for effective implementation, then the 
EPEP have achieved some measure of success. The promulgation of the use of 
ErA as a procedural norm within departments having key management responsibilitie~ 
(e.g. MWD, Ministry of Energy, Department of Lands and Survey, N.Z. Forest 
Service) has stimulated awareness of its intent, despite the difficulties CFE 
faces in monitoring the effects (A. Hutchison pers. comm.). However, the 
EPEP are formally recognized by and variably integrated with only two 
environmental statutes. Further, while the substantive intent of the EPEP 
is broadly paralleled in the policy basis of key environmental statutes 
(TCPA 1977 s.3,4; WSCA 1967 Long Title), procedural integration is poorly 
formalized (Chapter 4.2). 
Substantive influence of the EPEP on public policy-making is perhaps the 
most significant demonstration of its functional effectiveness. It is also 
extremely difficult to demonstrate. While particular successes with the 
operations of the EPEP may be justifiably claimed (e.g. Auckland Thermal I 
Power Station (1975); Marsden Point PVC Plant proposal (1976); Karioi Pulp 
Mill (1976); CSR - Baigent Pulp Mill (1980) in that there was a clear 
substantive influence on subsequent decision-making, most cases have had 
an equivocal influence. The complexities and uncertainties of each 
decision-making process constraint the value of focussing empirical 
analyses on particular case histories. The substantive scope of activities 
carried out under the EPEP is an important precondition for influencing policy. 
There have been very few generic (e. g. policy or programme) EIAs and reviews 
undertaken. The initiating role of CFE has gone Some way towards stlmulatlng 
aWareness of the implicati.ons of pollcy decisions at formatlve stages, through 
both ad hoc investigations and formal audits. Continuing case examples 
include the wild and scenic rivers policy and toxic chemicals policy. However, 
other investigations were evidently restricted in their influence by political 
and administrative commitment to certain policy stances (e.g. Maui gas 
development, LPG distribution policy, use of nitrogenous fertilizer). Further, 
many EIRs and audits have assessed proposals following substantive decisions 
on action design, and therefore have had limited influence. Now notorious 
examples include the Maui Project (1974); Upper Clutha Valley Development 
(1975); Clyde Power Project (1978); and the documentation of proposals under 
NDA (Methanol Plant, Waitara (1981); Synthetic Petrol Project (1981). 
The intimate and highly informal links between activities under EPEP and 
policy-making have at times provided self-limiting feedback on the substantive 
influence of assessment activities. This situation exists because of the 
direct power links between the political and administrative executive and the 
Commission for the Environment. public perceptions of the closeness of these 
links are shown by the vigorous call for "independence" in the operations of 
CFE and other environmental agencies influencing policy-making (OECO, 1981). 
Criticisms centre on the management of information and on the formal 
arrangement of the powers of actors in the EPEP,as important reform priorities. 
This study views the largely implicit, weakly legitimated and integrated 
policy basis of the EPEP as a significant constraint on the effectiveness 
of the Procedures. The set of linkages between EPEP and planning processes 
in New Zealand are also key determinants of the effectiveness of the EPEP. 
PLANNING CONTEXT 
The fragmented relationship that generally exists in most western countries 
between the EIARP and formalized planning processes is present in New Zealand. 
Initial and continuing non-acceptance of the EPEP as an integral part of 
planning processes has been a significant limiting influence on its 
effectiveness. The EPEP have been progressively restricted to major public 
proposals (or private proposals made public by virtue of public funding), 
originating from resource (i.e. functionally based) planning activities. 
Involvement of the EPEP in statutory (spatially oriented) planning has 
received little formal ratification. 
The protracted review (1972-1977) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953, 
whichresulted in the TCPA 1977, established its position at the outset 
(p.65) and at the end (p.71). The Town and Country Planning Act 1977, 
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while substantively broadening its policy basis (s.3,4), and the scope 
of judicial review by the Planning Tribunal, totally ignored the substantive 
value of an EIARP in planning th~ugh neither recognizing nor incorporating 
the EPEP into its procedures. Support by planners for the need to integrate 
the EPEP with formal land-use planning practices has been almost non-existent; 
Nahkies (1976), Lello (1976), Brunt (1978) and Salmon (1980) are exceptions. 
The recommendations of the government-appointed Task Force on Economic and 
Social Planning in 1976 were ignored. 
The Commission for the Environment initially recognized the need to integrate 
their operations with statutory planning procedures (1975 Revision of EPEP; 
Commissioner for the Environment, 1976). However, their stance became 
equivocal following their appreciation of procedural limitations of the key 
land-use planning statutes (TCPA and WSCA) concerning early public participation, 
assessment of alternatives and legal recognition of information (Commissioner for 
the Environment, 1978), albeit in a selective, ad hoc fashion (Commissioner for 
the Environment, 1981). The 1981 revision of the EPEP formally noted the 
requirement for "documented information on the environmental implications of 
a proposal" under the above and other environmental statutes. 
In practice, integration has been equally hesitant. Formal links between 
CFE and local and regional land-use planning agencies (territorial local 
authorities and catchment authorities) are not provided for and in fact do 
not exist (R. McClymont, pers. comm.). Proponent contact with CFE and 
involvement with the EPEP occurs solely on the basis of the statutory consent 
or public funding criteria. As the Commissioner for the Environment (1974) 
pointed out, there is no guarantee that development proposals not applicable 
via these criteria (e.g. "conforming uses", and those resulting from zoning 
changes) are subject to substantive EIA and review processes. Local authority 
contact with CFE in these circumstances is in practice "very rare" (R. 
McClymont, pers. comm.) and the assessment of land-based private developments 
under the EPEP inevitably occurs at a late stage of project design (i.e. 
immediately prior to consent application) . This latter situation is however 
a general procedural problem under the EPEP (see Institutional Context). 
Resource specific development planning is more closely integrated with the 
EPEP, through public ownership of many natural resources. The planning 
activities of government departments are formally linked to the EPEP by its 
application to: "the works and management policies of all Government 
departments which may affect the environment~ both as a general ~equirement 
and through statutory consent and public funding criteria. However, the 
often narrow and conflicting public development objectives, either mandated 
by statute or expressed through governmental policy-making, do not always 
provide a structured framework for resource planning. Despite this, many 
government departments and regional agencies have increasingly involved 
themselves in plan preparation, variably incorporating environmental impact 
assessments and public reviews of plans (e.g. Ministry of Energy, Department 
of Lands and Survey, N.Z. Forest Service and catchment authorities) (e.g. 
Commission for the Environment, 1977; OECD, 1981). It appears likely 
that the continuing efforts of CFE under its overview function has stimulated 
some of these developments. To this extent, procedural if not substantive 
integration of the EPEP as an EIARP with public planning processes has begun. 
However, only two statutes concerned in some way with resource planning have 
formally incorporated elements of EPEP under their procedures (NDA 1979 and 
the Mining Act 1971 (amended 1981)). 
In NDA, the effectiveness of the EIR and audit is substantively constrained 
by their use as post facto assessments of action design. Elements of the 
EPEP are formally recognized in the amended Mining Act, however this 
achievement is constrained by the formal schism between that Act and the 
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Town and Country Planning Act 1977. Proposal assessment and review is 
essentially ad hoc and coordinated with land-use planning through a reactive 
but an extraordinarily comprehensive jUdicial review by the Planning Tribunal. 
In summary, the EPEP has been unevenly and generally poorly integrated with 
formalized planning processes. 
constrained by this situation. 
Its fWlctional effectiveness can only be 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The institutional context of the EPEP refers to the formalized Procedures 
as rules, their relationship with the organizational entities involved, and 
the resulting institutional practices. Problems arise from the structure 
of the rules themselves, and their relationship with other institutions. 
The intended scope of application of the EPEP is substantively broad, and 
covers both public and private "works and management policies ll , and IIproposed 
actions", "which may affect the environment", via the public funding and 
statutory consent criteria. This scope thus misses the development actions 
not caught by these two criteria (Commissioner for the Environment, 1976). 
For example, the existence of cumulative impacts of non-applicable actions, 
through incremental development and environmental change is not formally 
recognized. This deficiency is especially relevant in land-use planning 
processes, which, through their own structuring, may not substantively assess 
cumulative impacts (e.g. of zoning and zoning changes) . 
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The practice of application has been selective. 
formally applied to the EIR and audit procedure. 
Some 90 proposals have been 
An unknown number of actions 
have been subject by departments to the less formal "environmental assessment" 
as a screening activity. The bulk of proposals formally applied have been 
specific actions (projects) concerning energy-related developments. The 
EPEP have been generally ignored as a procedure for the assessment of generlc 
actions. The Commission has initiated policy assessments through a continuing 
programme of submissions and discussion papers, however virtually no generic 
EIAs have been formally reviewed by CFE. Notwithstanding this formal EIRs 
and audits have had a variable "policy" content. EIRs on forestry proposals 
perhaps stand out as examples of attempts by proponent organizations to 
explicitly consider policy implications. 
Because of loosely worded instructions, the structure of the formalized EPEP 
has created continuing confusion by all actors over concepts, activities and 
terminology. Successive restatements by CFE have tended to add to this 
confusion. The desire for flexibility of use has resulted in vague and 
ambiguous definitions and directions, producing a significant degree of 
uncertainty in practice. 
Formalized screening activities exemplify this situation. 
procedure is specified, and concepts are loosely defined. 
No clear 
"Environmental 
impact assessment" or "environmental assessment" is described as a generic 
process "from the inception of a proposal ... to actual implementation" 
(no reference is made to post-implementation assessment of monitoring activities) 
"ElA" is then described as an activity to determine whether an EIR is required 
(i.e. as a screening activity) "backed by appropriate documentation". This 
dual definition appears to have created sufficient confusion and discretion 
for proponents to screen proposals in an inconsistent and selective fashion. 
The 1978 amendments and the Commission's restatement in 1979 effectively 
formalized this discretion. As Mills (1979c) notes, the absence of a clear 
reference to the nature of the initial assessment, including its documentation, 
exacerbated this situation. 
Proponent control over screening is virtually complete. The proponent 
decides when and how to screen the proposal, and also makes the decision 
on further assessment (the EIR) . No formal external review of screening is 
required under the EPEP. However, CFE has traditionally encouraged depart-
ments to make assessments available for public and interagency scrutiny (e.g. 
Commissioner for the Environment, 1979). CFE as the administrative reviewer 
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does not receive or review all departmental "EIAs" or their screening 
decisions, however, since 1978 liaison between .. the Commission and departments 
has allowed CFE to "advise" on screening activities (A. Hutchison, pers.comm.). 
Under the ~tining Amendment Act 1981 initial assessments for prospecting and 
mining licence applications, have been legally formalized. The COmnUssion 
reviews all such assessments through a departmental arrangement (A. Hutchison 
pers. corom.). However, the general lack of external review makes any 
evaluation of the practice of screening problematic. In particular, informal 
assessments carried out by private proponents are impossible to verify or 
evaluate. 
The substantive criteria for the operation of EPEP activities are specified 
as rules only for the preparation of EIRs as formal EIAs and are not applied 
under the screening decision. "Environment" is broadly but vaguely defined. 
"Human" environment is open to interpretation, and has been redefined in the 
1981 revision under the EIR scope as the equally vague "surrounding community". 
The relationship of the definition of environment as an operative criterion, 
to that in the model format for the EIR (Appendix A) (no less vague), was 
made more discretionary in 1981 through now being subject to proponent 
"commitments" on action design (see below). 
However, the criteria for determination of "significant impact" (and thus 
EIR preparation), while discretionary, are broadly comprehensive and provide 
clear guidelines for further assessment. These criteria refer to space-time 
contexts, including cumulative impacts, "substantial public interest", 
and the significance of particular impacts, for example on ecosystems, 
resources and the existence of pollution. 
Public involvement in the EPEP is first manifest in the discretionary 
notification to the public by CFE of the proponent's intent to prepare an 
EIR. There is no public involvement formally provided for in screening, 
scoping or the EIR. 
The 1981 revision for the first time introduced a formalized scoping activity 
for the preparation of EIRs on specific actions (projects). Previously, 
decisions on scope were for the proponent to make, subject to interpretation 
88. 
of the requirements of the model format for the EIR. This situation resulted 
in the preparation of many EIRs that were considered by the Commission to be 
substantively defective in their scope of assessment. The most persistent 
criticisms appearing in audits concerned the scope of "environment" adopted 
in the EIR, the lack of consideration of action "need", and the poor assessment 
of alternatives. The 1981 amendment provides for a discretionary scoping 
discussion between the proponent, CFE and appropriate government officials. 
No clear authority is established for the resolution of disagreements on 
scoping, and there is no requirement for public involvement in scoping. 
In the EPEP, the EIR is prepared by or on behalf of the proponent, with the 
help of specialist advisors from government or private orgunizations. The 
EIR is required to be prepared sufficiently early "to ensure that all processes 
are completed [including the audit] ••• by the time a decision is required .•. 
which would conunit resources to the proposal". Up until 1981, the EIR 
has been clearly required to follow the model format. This format generally 
specified all the substantive elements of an EIA recognized in most EIARPs 
(p.49) except that it did not specify any requirement for a description of 
a monitoring programme for the proposal, should it be implemented (see below). 
However, the discretionary nature of the entire Procedures has allowed 
minimal recognition in many cases of the above requirements. 
The substantive problems of late timing and narrow scope of EIA in the EIR 
have dogged the EPEPS operations. Despite repeated attempts by CFE through 
revisions of the EPEP and departmental pressuring, to require earlier use of 
an EIR with a substantively broad scope, the trend has been to institutionalize 
a late and narrow scope of EIA. The EIR and audit procedure has been applied 
to obviously major projects at a stage in proponent decision-making immediately 
prior to statutory consent and/or funding application. 
This is a universal problem within the EIARP. Positive constraints of 
institutional decision-making (e.g. Miller, Anderson and Liroff, 1976) 
generate close links between the budgetary cycle and the sequence of design 
decisions. Financial commitment often requires a series of policy decisions 
early in the development planning process. These decisions may effectively 
foreclose options from further assessment and design becomes progressively 
specific. As under the EPEP, project-only EIRs together with the inevitable 
inflexibilities of design have resulted. Furthermore, welfare economic 
norms require the bounding of costs and benefits in space and time, often 
resulting in a narrow scope of EIA on the development proposal. 
While the EPEP provide for successive EIRs through which to iteratively 
assess and adjust development design, this procedure simply has not been 
applied in practice. Virtually all EIRs produced have been Hone-offlJ 
assessments. A further problem has been the lack of provision for the 
Commission as the administrative reviewer to reject an EIR as "inadequate". 
In practice, once an EIR is submitted for review, an audit has resulted 
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and no further EIRs have followed on the same proposal. The N.Z. Steel 
Expansion at Glenbrook provides a current example of an EIR in which the 
reassessment of a proposed option may result. The 1981 EIR assessed a single 
option for a linear development (a rail link) and presented economic data 
in support of this proposal as a preferred option. The 1982 audit 
reassessed options and recommended that N.Z. Steel reconsider its preferred 
option in the light of the audit. 
The 1981 revision of the EPEP substantively modified requirements concerning 
the timing and scope of the EIR and audit, following concern at the influence 
of an audit on the approval of a pulpmill proposal near Nelson (Chapter 4.2 
History of Operations). The model format for an EIR is now formally 
discretionary (CFE, 1982-cl.20) and several substantive requirements have 
been removed. The format is to be followed subject to "design ... commitments" 
of the proponent. Within'this broad discretion, "options" may now not be 
described nor subject to explicit assessment, if options have been "determined" 
by the proponent. In particular, the requirement to consider the "no-action" 
option is now removed. If form, location, scope and operational characteristics" 
have been "clarified" by the proponent, the EIR is now required to cover a 
vague and potentially restrictive scope ("direct physical and biological impacts 
of a project and ••• a general treatment of significant impacts on the 
surrounding community" (emphasis added». Further, financial responsibility 
for "works" is a further criterion to limit this scope, and assessment of 
"alternative technologies" is not required "where choices •.. have been made 
by the proponent". 
Further uncertainties now arise. The broad general definition of the EIR 
still stands (CFE, 1982, c1.8), however this is likely to be subject to the 
discretions outlined above. Furthermore, while the provision for seoping 
discussions appears to override all the above discretions, there is 
obviously sufficient uncertainty present for the proponent to substantially 
control the scope of the EIR prepared. The proponent may claim that 
decisions have already been made concerning choice of options generally, 
and technological design options in particular, thus allowing the carrying 
out of a substantively restricted EIA. 
Review of the EIR by the public is the first real point of public involvement 
in the EPEP.A four week time limit for public and interagency review was 
constantly criticized in many submissions to the Commission regarding major 
proposals. .The 1981 revision extended this period to six weeks. The scope 
of public and interagency review has been substantively broad (i.e. no 
restrictions have applied). Until 1981, the EPEP specified a similarly 
90. 
broad scope for the administrative review by the Commission. This scope 
included the· checking of the identification and evaluation of all environmental 
implications (broadly defined), as well as the study of various alternative 
proposals, and of mitigation measures described in the EIR. For its audit 
(the review document) the Commission has traditionally sought technical 
advice and expertise from government departments, which have generally 
co-operated well. Despite a two month time limit for audit preparation 
(until 1981), a generally broad range of submissions has been incorporated 
into the substantive review. In practice, audits have varied in their 
scope of review; socio-economic impacts have been traditionally less 
systematically examined than ecological and physical impacts. It is clear 
that time and manpower constraints have forced CFE to broadly scope and 
critique the EIR and submissions, and not to undertake substantive assessments. 
The 1981 revision extended the period of review and audit preparation from 
two to three months. 
The EPEP do not provide for a decision by CFE on the adequacy of the EIR, 
either upon receipt or following review. Further, the Procedures do not 
explicitly provide for a reviewer decision in the form of a recommendation 
on the proposal. In practice, CFE has made increasingly explicit 
recommendations concerning the proposal under review. 
Under the 1981 revision of the EPEP, the audit scope is now more vaguely 
defined, and a specific restriction now applies. The audit is now "the 
document providing an independent opinion from the Commissioner for the 
Environment on the environmental implications of the proposal described 
in an EIR" (CFE, 1982 cl.34). The Commissioner has a broad general 
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discretion to "note and verify the information in an EIR" , and to "provide 
additional information and make any comments as are appropriate". However, 
now: "the Commissioner will not concern himself with the economic implications 
of the proposal including those relating to alternative resource use". 
Further, "policy questions" raised inpu.Qlic submissions are to be referred 
to the appropriate agencies. The Commissioner has evidently construed these 
restrictions narrowly (CFE Newsletter, May 1982), regarding the "economic 
implications of alternative resource use" to-be all that is excluded from 
the scope of the audit. The statement regarding policy questions is highly 
ambiguous. One interpretation offered by the Commission is that in addition 
to administrative review of (economic) policy questions (conc~rning alternative 
resource use), submissions concerning such questions will also be sent to 
government agencies (R. McClymont, pers. comm.). The events and decisions 
chronicled in the history of operations suggest that Cabinet intended a 
restriction on the Commission's scope of review, however once more, the very 
looseness of the wording in the Procedures creates a high degree of uncertainty. 
In 1981, two applications and a number of legal cases involving a third 
application under NDA were heard, and the NDA was amended. In EDS V SPA 
Ltd and others (Um:epl'. CA Decis. 114/81, woodhouse P. held that the EIR 
"will include adequate and reliable reference to every matter that is 
significant and relevant and so provide a coherent and significant basis for 
considera tion ... " by all review actors under NDA proposals. While it 
was held that some proponent discretion on EIR scope must exist, especially 
on the directness of impacts assessed, Woodhouse P. held that "what may be 
reasonably expected... must be given as a matter of obligation". On the 
subject of the audit, it was held that the Commissioner would "give attention 
in his audit to some of (the) secondary implications ... of a proposed work", 
and that the audit should be "available for use by those concerned to be heard 
at the enquiry by the Planning Tribunal". 
The judgement apparently influenced the National Development Amendment Act 
which required the Commissioner to: "audit the (EIR) by examining and giving 
his opinion on the accuracy and adequacy of the report in so far as it relates 
to the proposed work" (NDA Amendment Act 1981 s.2). The NDA provision 
requiring the Commissioner to "be independent", the CA judgement and the above 
amendment are referred to by Kenderdine (1982) in concluding that no 
substantive change has been made to the scope of the audit under NDA. Palmer 
(1982) concurs with this interpretation. Further, the CA judgement makes 
explicit the potential scope required for an EIR under NDA. 
Kenderdine (1982) notes the variable influence of audits on development 
decision-making. A complete examination of significant cases is not only 
beyond the scope of this study, but is also of questionable value in an 
attempt to examine the general effectiveness of the EIR and audit process 
in substantively influencing executive decision-making. 
The EPEP do not provide for substantive assessment and review of development 
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proposals following their implementation. There is no formalized requirement 
for the establishment- of a monitoring programme in order to track environmental 
conditions affected by the development action. In practice, procedures 
for statutory consent may require the inspection of operations by government 
officials in order to enforce compliance with conditions attached to the 
consents for the development action. However, this de facto monitoring 
is poorly formalized in New Zealand. It is generally fragmented, and dependent 
entirely on the mandate, resources and efforts of existing statutory 
authorities for any functional effectiveness. There is no comprehensive 
framework for the assessment of unexpected impacts, and mitigation measures 
may only be enforced by the current institutional framework for development 
control. The capacity for adjustment of actions following a decision 
on the results of any formalized monitoring is also variable. For example, 
the Mining Amendment Act 1981 is an attempt to adapt a previously deficient 
administrative process to the post-implementation requirements necessary 
following a comprehensive pre-implementation assessment and review of mining 
developments. Compliance with statutory conditions for mitigation of 
impacts is forced by the arbitrary imposition of a monetary bond. No 
comprehensive or adaptive monitoring programme is prescribed by the Mining 
Act, and the relevant statutory authorities undertake monitoring activities 
under their own institutional framework. 
The monitoring of socio-economic impacts in connection with major industrial 
projects has been pioneered to some extent in New Zealand. The long-running 
programme of the Social Sciences Department, University of Waikato (Fookes 
et al. 1981) has helped significantly in forcing a recognition by the 
government that monitoring is an integral requirement of development planning 
and must be provided for in the design of development actions. However, 
the absence of an explicit and comprehensive requirement in the EPEP for the 
design of a monitoring programme, with assessment and review activities 
following action implementation, is a significant substantive deficiency. 
There is a significant procedural problem concerning the relationship of 
the EPEP with the organizational entities involved. The essentially 
informal (nonstatutory) nature of the Procedures and their administering 
authority, the Commission for the Environment, has meant that administrative 
and political discretions either exercised within or imposed upon the 
EPEP have strongly influenced their implementation and effectiveness. From 
the inception of the EPEP's operations, many commentators have argued that 
the EPEP or some substantive equivalent should be statutorily based. 
Mills (1979c) presents a cogent argument for the statutory establishment 
of the Procedures: 
"To establish a system which is fundamentally premised 
on an objective and public appraisal of the government's 
environmental policies is to call for a high level of 
political maturity .•• (T)here will be times when the 
information that is generated by such a system will be 
strenuously resisted by the Government of the day. If 
improving environmental policy is a serious objective 
and in the abstract it is acknowledged that the 
environmental impact reporting system is a valuable 
component in this, then it is naive to expect a system 
generating such tensions to continue to survive in a 
context where it exists solely at the behest of the 
very Cabinet whose policies it will - at least by 
inference - be frequently criticizing." 
This argument accords with many critical studies in administrations where 
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the EIARP is an informal, administrative procedure (Chapter 3.3 Institutional 
Framework) . 
The defence of a non-statutory basis is usually given as a criticism of legal 
procedures. It is stated that statutory definition is rigid, and causes 
delays and costs through litigation and judicial reviews of actions and 
decisions. In New Zealand, the Commission for the Environment has 
encouraged flexibility of operations under the EPEP, and has attempted to be 
internally adaptive by responding to perceived problems. However, on the 
one hand, "flexibility" was officially endorsed by both Commission and 
Cabinet to such an extent that the risk of substantive noncompliance became 
significant. And on the other hand, internal adaptiveness (seen in the 
continual internal reviews of the EPEP) was largely thwarted by externally 
imposed constraints of administrative and political institutions, often 
sceptical of the value of the EPEP. 
The original decision in 1973 to formalize the EPEP by executive decree 
rather than by the legislatUre appears to have been influenced by the 
potential for delays and costs through legal action and jUdicial reviews 
of ~overnmental activities. The U.S. experience of jUdicial influence 
on the implementation of NEPA loomed large at the time. However, a recent 
analysis of the history of litigation under NEPA (Liroff, 1981) examined 
perceptions concerning the amount and effects of legal action on federal 
development planning. Liroff found that following an initial rise in 
litigation following judicial interpretation of an extremely opaque statute, 
litigation declined, and in the 10 years to 1980, approximately 10 percent 
of all proposals assessed under NEPA involved court action. The Federal 
government apparently had considerable success in defending itself, and 
during the period 1970-1977 no actions were permanently halted by litigation 
under NEPA, and approximately 20 percent of all proposals litigated were 
actually delayed by up to a year. Liroff also noted the ability of the 
U.S. Legislature to limit the scope of judicial review under NEPA. 
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Commentators on the u.S. experience of legally formalized EIARPs (e.g. 
Liroff, 1976; Wandesforde-Smith, 1980a, 1981) have noted their evolutionary 
nature. Wandesforde-Smith points out the need for built-in flexibility to 
provide for structured change in implementation. The structured discretions 
detailed under the NEPA Regulations resulted from eight years' experience 
and provide a case in point. Commentators on administratively formalized 
EIARPs (e.g. Rees, 1980; Lucas, 1981; Fowler, 1981) cite the need for clear 
indications of the powers of actors, to ensure a minimum degree of 
substantive compliance. 
The effectiveness of the operations of the EPEP has been significantly 
constrained by internally generated and externally imposed discretions. 
To the extent that there has been substantive weakening by procedural 
uncertainties, there is a strong case for legal formalization. 
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CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study began with the observation that perceptions of the problem concerning 
the influences of decision-making and development on environmental change, 
govern the institution of a strategy for its solution. The environmental 
impapt assessment and review process is a strategy for environmental management, 
operating in many countries in response to local problem definitions. 
The filter of the national political culture of each country influences the 
design and implementation of an EIARP. The particular structure and 
function of the formalized process, and the nature of mutual influences between 
it and its social and institutional environment, affect the implementation 
of the EIARP. Systemic features of the EIARP exist which may significantly 
affect its functional effectiveness. These are the substantive and procedural 
linkages between successive EIA and review processes, and the policy and 
planning contexts of the EIARP. 
A normative framework for the EIARP can only be specified in general terms. 
The normative criteria of comprehensiveness, adaptiveness, legitimation and 
integration summarize the nature and purpose of the EIARP and its relationship 
with the wider social and institutional environment. 
The New Zealand Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures are the 
result of the awareness and appreciation by successive governments of the 
need to institut~ guidance of decision-making and adjustment of development 
through an EIARP. The Procedures were implemented within a tradition of 
internalized governmental decision-making, balanced by moderate political 
accountability and interest group influences. 
The design of the EPEP allowed variable acknowledgement of the implicit and 
weak policy basis, and its loose and informal structure generated a high 
degree of uncertainty concerning operations. Environmental management 
policy developed during the period of operations was generally poorly integrated 
with the EPEP. In particular, the relationship between the Procedures 
and formal planning processes remained weak and confused. 
The continuing operations of the EPEP were progressively constrained through 
institutional pressures to formalize greater discretion and uncertainty. 
The present situation is that procedural deficiencies of the Procedures 
severely constrain their substantive intent, in a political climate that is, 
on the basis of previous influences, unlikely to mandate a strengthened 
process. 
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